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INNER ASIAN HISTORY  
(500-1800)



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(500-1800)

EDITED BY

NICOLA DI COSMO



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Illustration on the cover: Chinese ink drawing of the Mongol general Sübötei Ba'atur (1176-1248).

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THE BATTLE OF HERAT (1270):  
A CASE OF INTER-MONGOL WARFARE\*

Michal Biran

While Mongol campaigns of conquest in Asia and Europe have long caught the imagination of military historians, far less attention has been given to the inter-Mongol rivalries after the dissolution of the Mongol empire. This is not only because those conflicts seemed less engaging, but also because most of the inter-Mongol conflicts were merely raids or skirmishes which received only short notices in contemporary sources. In this context, the battle of Herat is an important exception.<sup>1</sup>

When the armies of the Ilkhan Abaqa (r. 1265–1282) met the troops of the Chaghadaid Khan Baraq (r. 1266–1271) in 1270 at Herat in present-day Afghanistan, it was for a full-scale and decisive combat. Abaqa's victory secured Ilkhanid rule in Khurāsān and precluded any real threat to the Ilkhanate's eastern frontier for several decades. Baraq's defeat resulted in the loss of the independence of the Chaghadaids, who were obliged to submit to Qaidu (1236–1301), Ögödei's grandson. Considering the role of the Golden Horde behind the scenes, the battle thus involved the four Chingissid *uluses*, and was influential in shaping the borders of the independent Mongol khanates.

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<sup>1</sup> Other major inter-Mongol battles include the wars between the Golden Horde and the Ilkhanate mainly in 1262 and 1265, about which see, e.g., Reuven Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks* (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 86–91; and the battle between the Central Asian Mongols under Qaidu and the Yuan forces in 1301, about which see Michal Biran, *Qaidu and the Rise of the Independent Mongol State in Central Asia* (Richmond, Surrey, 1997), pp. 52–4. The description of the battle of Herat in contemporary sources is, however, far more detailed than the descriptions of the above-mentioned battles.

This unique battle left its mark in historical records, both medieval and modern.<sup>2</sup> Yet, the military aspects of the battle have not yet been studied on the basis of the whole range of available sources. The works of the main Ilkhanid historians, Rashīd al-Dīn (d. 1318) and Waṣṣāf (d. circa 1328), whose descriptions serve as the basis for most of modern scholarship, devoted most of their attention to the Central Asian Mongols, who initiated the battle. Only through their works can one get the full political framework in which the battle took place.<sup>3</sup> For the military aspects, however, the local chronicles and the Mamluk sources are no less useful. The most important local chronicle is Harawī's *History of Herat*, written c. 1330, which makes use of Rashīd al-Dīn's work but adds many details.<sup>4</sup> Also valuable are the two chronicles of Kirmān, whose Sultan fought side by side with Abaqa,<sup>5</sup> the more apocryphal Georgian chronicle,<sup>6</sup> and the Arabic-Mamluk chronicles. As rivals of the Ilkhans, the Mamluks

<sup>2</sup> For the research literature see: Constantine A.M. D'Ohsson, *Histoire des Mongols* (The Hague, 1834, rpt. Tientsin, 1940), vol. 3, pp. 428–54; Henry H. Howorth, *The History of the Mongols from the 9th to the 19th Century* (London, 1888, rpt. New York, 1965), vol. 3, pp. 228–40; John A. Boyle, "Dynastic and Political History of the Ilkhans," in *The Saljuq and the Mongol Periods*, ed. John A. Boyle, Vol. 5 of *The Cambridge History of Iran* (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 357–60; Bertold Spuler, *Die Mongolen in Iran* (Leiden, 1985), pp. 61–4; A.P. Martinez, "Some Notes on the Il-Xanid Army," *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*, vol. 6 (1988), pp. 152–7; Biran, *Qaidu*, pp. 31–2.

<sup>3</sup> For Rashīd al-Dīn see David O. Morgan, "Rashīd al-Dīn Ṭabīb," *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., vol. 8 (1995), pp. 458–9 and the references there; David O. Morgan, *The Mongols* (Oxford, 1986), pp. 13–14. For Waṣṣāf see *Ibid.*, pp. 14–15; Edward G. Browne, *A Literary History of Persia* (Cambridge, 1951), vol. 3, pp. 67–8. Shorter descriptions of the battle appear in other Ilkhanid sources: Ḥamdallāh Qazwīnī, *Ta'rikh-i Guzīda* (Leiden, 1913), pp. 577, 582; and the Arabic chronicle ascribed to Ibn al-Fuwaṭī (Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, *al-Hawādith al-Jāmi'a* (Baghdad, 1932–3), p. 357). I have also made use of the later Persian chronicle of Mürkhwānd (d. 1498). Mürkhwānd, who wrote in Timurid Herat, used Rashīd al-Dīn, Waṣṣāf and Harawī or his sources (see below). Yet he also preserved details about the Central Asian Mongols which are not to be found in earlier works (W.W. Barthold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion* (4th edition, London, 1977), p. 58).

<sup>4</sup> Sayf b. Muḥammad Harawī, *Ta'rikh nāmah-i Harāt*, ed. M. Ṣiddiqī (Calcuta, 1944), pp. 303–30. On Harawī see Ṣiddiqī's introduction to this edition, pp. 10–15. Martinez extensively used Harawī's work, though I am not in accord with his conclusions (see below, esp. pp. 202ff.).

<sup>5</sup> *Simt al-'ulā*, written c. 1317, and especially the *Ta'rikh-i shāhī*, written c. 1317 or earlier. About those works see Bāstanī-Parīzī's introduction to: Anonymous, *Ta'rikh-i shāhī-i Qara Khitā'yyān*, ed. M.I. Bāstanī-Parīzī (Tehran, 1966–7), pp. 1–19, 30–32.

<sup>6</sup> *Histoire de la Georgie*, trans. M. Brosset (St. Peterburg, 1850), Part 1, pp. 573–86 (hereafter, *The Georgian Chronicle*). This source is used by Howorth, Spuler and Martinez.

showed interest in Abaqa's struggles in the east—struggles that kept him away from Syria—and their independent version of the conflict is therefore of interest. The most detailed Mamluk description of the battle of Herat appears in the work of the Syrian historian al-Yūnīnī (d. 1326), which is repeated, with several changes, in the later works of Ibn al-Dawādārī (d. after 1335) and Mufaḍḍal (d. after 1358).<sup>7</sup> Another set of Mamluk sources provides many details about the Tegüder incident that preceded the battle, though not all of them connect it to the battle of Herat.<sup>8</sup> One should bear in mind, however, that apart from Marco Polo's blurred version of this battle,<sup>9</sup> all the sources originated in Herat or westward. The Chaghadaid version of the events therefore did not come down to us.<sup>10</sup>

On the basis of a close comparison between Arabic and Persian sources, this essay aims to reconstruct the background and course of the battle of Herat. This is followed, after a short discussion of the battle's results, by an analysis of the military aspects of the battle, in which I have tried to explain the reasons for Abaqa's victory, as well as to compare this battle to Mongol wars against "foreign" (i.e., non-Mongol) rivals.

<sup>7</sup> On al-Yūnīnī and his sources see the introduction of Li Guo, *Early Mamluk Syrian Historiography* (Leiden, 1998), vol. 1, pp. 6–21, 60–80. None of al-Yūnīnī's extant sources mentioned there (e.g., Ibn Khallikān) is identified as the source for his information on the battle of Herat. On the relationship between the three Mamluk writers (al-Yūnīnī, Ibn al-Dawādārī and al-Mufaḍḍal) see Donald P. Little, *Introduction to Mamluk Historiography* (Wiesbaden, 1970), pp. 10–11, 33–6, 53–61. Shorter notices on the battle appear in other Mamluk sources, e.g., Baybars al-Manṣūrī (d. 1325), *Zubdat al-fikra fī ta'rikh al-hijra* (ed. D.S. Richards, Beirut, 1998), pp. 116, 121; MS BL Add 23325, fol. 77a, hence Badr al-Dīn al-'Aynī (d. 1451), *Iqd al-jumān fī ta'rikh ahī al-zamān*, MS Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmet III, 2912, fols. 100a, 104a; Shams al-Dīn al-Dhahabī (d. 1348), *Ta'rikh al-islām* (Beirut, 1999), vol. 52, p. 51; Ibn Kathīr (d. 1373), *al-Bidāya wa'l-nihāya* (Cairo, 1939), vol. 13, p. 255.

<sup>8</sup> Baybars al-Manṣūrī, *Zubdat al-fikra*, p. 141, fols. 81b–82a; hence al-'Aynī, *Iqd*, fol. 106a; Ibn al-Furāt, *Ta'rikh al-duwal wa'l-muluk* (Beirut, 1942), vol. 7, p. 9; al-Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat al-arab* (Cairo, 1984), vol. 27, p. 396 (where Qaidu and not Baraq initiated the battle). Al-Yūnīnī and Ibn al-Dawādārī mention the incident as the background of the battle of Herat; Baybars and al-'Aynī mention it also before the battle but describe it in detail only after it, in 1274, and this later date is followed by al-Nuwayrī and Ibn al-Furāt.

<sup>9</sup> Marco Polo, *The Book of Sir Marco Polo*, trans. Henry Yule (London, 1903), vol. 2, p. 66; Marco Polo, *The Description of the World*, trans. Arthur C. Moule and Paul Pelliot (London, 1935–1938), vol. 2, pp. 456–7. To the best of my knowledge, Chinese sources of the 13th–14th centuries do not mention this battle, being primarily preoccupied for those years with Qubilai's campaigns against the Song.

<sup>10</sup> The only Central Asian source of this period, Jamāl Qārshī, does not

*The Background: The Coming of Baraq into Central Asia*

The battle of Herat was initiated by Baraq, the Chaghadaid khan who arrived in Central Asia only a few years before the battle took place. Yet the roots for Baraq's actions are to be sought not only in his immediate circumstances, but also in the two great Mongol succession struggles: the Toluid *coup d'état* of 1251, which promoted Möngke to the throne of the Qa'an, the supreme leader of the Mongol empire, at the expense of his cousins the Ögödeids; and the inter-Toluid rivalry that followed Möngke's death (1259), when his two brothers Qubilai and Arigh Böke contested the Qa'anate.<sup>11</sup>

Möngke's accession led to the dissolution of the Ögödeid *ulus*, and greatly harmed the Chaghadaids, who had been the Ögödeids' allies. The Jochids, khans of the Golden Horde, whose leader was instrumental in enthroning Möngke, quickly manipulated Chaghadaid weakness, taking over Transoxania and Western Turkestan, formerly under Chaghadaid control. The Chaghadaid share in the empire's revenues was also taken over by the Jochids and the Toluids.<sup>12</sup> The Toluids were naturally the great beneficiaries of Möngke's rise. After his accession Möngke placed his two brothers Qubilai and Hülegü, Abaqa's father, in charge of China and Iran respectively. The two brothers expanded the empire's borders each in his own direction, thereby creating the basis for two new regional khanates.<sup>13</sup>


The Qubilai-Arigh Böke struggle that followed Möngke's death gave the deprived *uluses* of Central Asia a chance to restore the for-

mention the battle, yet he supplies the chronological framework for Qaidu and the Chaghadaid's succession. On him see Peter Jackson, "Djamāl Ḳarshī," *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., Supp. 3-4 (1981), p. 240.

<sup>11</sup> For these conflicts and their role in the dissolution of the Mongol Empire see Peter Jackson, "The Dissolution of the Mongol Empire," *Central Asiatic Journal*, Vol. 22, no. 2 (1978), pp. 186-244; for a detailed discussion of Möngke's accession and its consequences see also Thomas T. Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism* (Berkeley, 1987), pp. 18-44; for the struggle between Qubilai and Arigh Böke see Morris Rossabi, *Khubilai Khan* (Berkeley, 1988), pp. 34-5; Zhou Liangxiao, *Hubilie* (Jilin, 1986), pp. 46-65.

<sup>12</sup> Peter Jackson, "From *Ulus* to Khanate: The Making of the Mongol States c. 1220-1290," *The Mongol Empire and its Legacy*, ed. Reuven Amitai and David O. Morgan (Leiden, 1999), p. 29; Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 16; Jackson, "Dissolution," p. 207; Barthold, *Turkestan*, pp. 483-5.

<sup>13</sup> Thomas T. Allsen, "The Rise of the Mongolian Empire and Mongolian Rule in North China," *Alien Regimes and Border States 907-1368*, ed. Herbert Franke and Denis Twitchett, vol. 6 of *The Cambridge History of China* (Cambridge, 1994), p. 394; Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 17; for more details on the conquests in Möngke's time, see, e.g., Allsen, "The Rise," pp. 403-7.



Map 1: The Mongol Empire after the Death of Möngke (1259)  
(After Biran, *Qaidu* [Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 1997], 114).

tunes of their lineages. Taking advantage of the Golden Horde's preoccupation with the Ilkhanate in the early 1260s, the new Chaghadaid Khan Alghu (r. 1261–66) took over the former Chaghadaid territories and much more, and consolidated his authority in the cities of Samarkand and Bukhara, formerly under the Qa'an. Switching his support from Arigh Böke to Qubilai, thereby largely facilitating the latter's victory, Alghu also gained Qubilai's confirmation to his rule over the territory stretching from the Altai to the Oxus.<sup>14</sup> Qubilai was also obliged to confirm Hülegü's rule over the territory "from the banks of the Oxus up to the gates of Egypt," in order to gain his support. This confirmation was a major factor in the outbreak of hostilities between, on one side, Hülegü and his descendants, the Ilkhans, and, on the other, the Golden Horde, which had its own claims on parts of Iran.<sup>15</sup>

The Qubilai-Arigh Böke conflict also prompted Ögödei's grandson, Qaidu, to restore the dissolved Ögödeid *ulus*, whose territories had become, after Qubilai's arrangements, part of Alghu's territory. Unable to cope alone with Alghu, Qaidu turned to the Golden Horde for help. The Golden Horde Khan, Berke (r. 1257–67) was willing to cooperate against their common enemy. With Berke's aid, Qaidu managed to vanquish Alghu once, but was badly defeated in his second attempt. Only Alghu's death in late 1265 or early 1266 prevented Qaidu from paying a heavier price for this defeat.<sup>16</sup>

Alghu's death set the stage for Baraq's activities. Starting his career in Qubilai's camp in China, where his father had been banished in 1251 due to his pro-Ögödeid tendencies, Baraq won Qubilai's favor by performing "praiseworthy services" for him.<sup>17</sup> Sometime

<sup>14</sup> On Alghu see Barthold, *Turkestan*, pp. 488–92; Liu Yingsheng, "Ali Buge zhi luan yu Chahatai hanguo de fazhan," *Xinjiang daxue xuebao*, 1987, pp. 30–34.

<sup>15</sup> Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jāmi' al-tawārīkh*, vol. 2, ed. E. Blochet (London and Leiden, 1911), p. 398 (hereafter: Rashīd/Bloch); Rashīd al-Dīn, *The Successors of Genghis Khan*, trans. J.A. Boyle (New York and London, 1971), pp. 255–6 (hereafter: Rashīd/Boyle); Mīrkhwānd, *Rawdat al-safā* (Tehran, 1961), vol. 5, p. 196; Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 23; Jackson, "Dissolution," pp. 208–35.

<sup>16</sup> Mīrkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, p. 201; W.W. Barthold, *Four Studies on the History of Central Asia* (Leiden, 1956–1962), vol. 1, pp. 123–4; Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 22.

<sup>17</sup> 'Alā' al-Dīn 'Aṭā'-malik Juwaynī, *Ta'rikh-i jahān gushā*, ed. M.M. Qazwīnī (London, 1912–37), vol. 3, pp. 64–5; 'Alā' al-Dīn 'Aṭā'-malik Juwaynī, *History of World Conqueror*, trans. J.A. Boyle (Manchester, 1958), vol. 2, pp. 591–2; Rashīd/Bloch, pp. 7, 169, 188; Rashīd/Boyle, pp. 23, 139, 151; Barthold, *Four Studies*, vol. 1, p. 125; Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 24.

after 1263 Baraq received Qubilai's permission to return to Central Asia.<sup>18</sup> According to Rashīd al-Dīn, after Alghu's death Baraq gained from Qubilai a *yarligh* ('command' or 'order') appointing him as a joint ruler over the Chaghadaid *ulus* together with Mubārak Shāh (r. 1265–66). Mubārak Shāh was the son of Alghu's widow, Orghina, from her first marriage. She had chosen him to succeed Alghu, apparently without getting the Qa'an's permission.<sup>19</sup> By sending Baraq, Qubilai hoped to secure his interests in the Chaghadaid *ulus*, and to have an ally against Qaidu, who refused to accept his authority.<sup>20</sup> When Baraq arrived in Central Asia, and found out that Orghina and Mubārak Shāh had firmly established their power, he kept the decree in his possession a secret, and presented himself as a refugee seeking to return to his original appanage. Mubārak Shāh allowed him to settle on his patrimonial appanage in the Chaghāniyān region, near Tirmidh, on the banks of the Oxus. Baraq gradually won the loyalty of the members of Mubārak Shāh's army, and eventually deposed him, degrading him to the rank of a hunting inspector.<sup>21</sup> Rashīd al-Dīn's description is, however, incompatible with Jamāl Qarshī's dates. According to Qarshī, the only Central Asian source for those events, Mubārak Shāh was enthroned in March 1266, and deposed by Baraq in September of the same year.<sup>22</sup> If those dates are correct, then Baraq must have arrived in Central Asia before Alghu's death, and indeed Rashīd al-Dīn mentions that he asked Qubilai for permission to leave after the surrender of Arigh Böke, in 1264.<sup>23</sup> It is hard to determine whether and when he received Qubilai's decree, which is not mentioned at all in the *Yuan shi*, the official history of the Yuan dynasty. Since Baraq turned against the

<sup>18</sup> Song Lian, *Yuan shi* (Beijing, 1976), vol. 1, chap. 5, p. 91.

<sup>19</sup> Rashīd/Bloch, p. 188; Rashīd/Boyle, p. 151; Barthold, *Four Studies*, vol. 1, p. 125; Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 24.

<sup>20</sup> Rashīd/Bloch, p. 189; Rashīd/Boyle, p. 151; Ibn Faḍlallāh al-'Umarī, *Das Mongolische Weltreich: al-'Umarī's Darstellung der mongolischen Reiche in seinem Werk Masālik al-abṣār fi mamālik al-amṣār*, ed. and trans. K. Lech (Wiesbaden, 1968), p. 2.

<sup>21</sup> Rashīd/Bloch, p. 169; Rashīd/Boyle, pp. 139–40; 'Abdallāh b. Faḍlallāh Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf* (Tehran, 1959–60), pp. 16, 67; 'Abd Āl Muḥammad Ayātī, *Tahrīr-i ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf* (Tehran, 1967), pp. 5, 37; Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 24. Mubārak Shāh's exact title was *muqaddam bārschiyān*, the inspector of those who hunt with cheetahs. See Gerhard Doerfer, *Türkische und mongolische Elemente im Neupersischen* (Wiesbaden, 1963–74), vol. 2, p. 238.

<sup>22</sup> Jamāl Qarshī, *Mulkhagāt al-Surāh* in V.V. Bartold, *Turkestan v epokhu 'mongol'skogo nashestiva* (St. Petersburg, 1900), vol. 1 (texts), p. 138.

<sup>23</sup> Rashīd/Bloch, p. 189; Rashīd/Boyle, p. 151.

Qa'an's troops immediately after Mubārak Shāh's banishment, it is unlikely that the decree played a decisive role in his attaining the Chaghadaid leadership.<sup>24</sup>

If Qubilai expected Baraq to represent his interests faithfully, he was to be disappointed: Baraq's first action as the Chaghadaid Khan was to defeat Qubilai's garrison in Khotan, in east Turkestan, and plunder the city. Yet in 1268 Baraq received a grant from Qubilai, who probably still hoped to secure his alliance against Qaidu.<sup>25</sup> Baraq, however, had his own reasons for confronting Qaidu. First, in trying to revive the dissolved territory of the Ögödeid *ulus*, Qaidu took over territories that were allocated by Qubilai to Alghu, i.e., the Chaghadaid lineage. More concretely, around 1268, after an abortive attempt to invade Besh Baliq, Qaidu was compelled to retreat westwards, evacuating Almaliq and withdrawing more than a thousand kilometers westwards. Having moved west of Talas, he was getting dangerously close to Baraq.<sup>26</sup> Fearing that Qaidu had set his sights on Samarkand and Bukhara, Baraq decided to attack him. Setting an ambush for Qaidu's forces, Baraq inflicted a crushing defeat on Qaidu on the banks of the Jaxartes. Again Qaidu turned for assistance to the Golden Horde, whose new ruler, Möngke Temür (r. 1267–80), perhaps fearing the rise of a second Alghu, sent his uncle, Berkecher, to Qaidu's help with allegedly 50,000 men. With their support Qaidu was able to defeat Baraq near Khojand, on the banks of the Jaxartes, and apparently overran Transoxania.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>24</sup> Biran, *Qaidu*, pp. 24–5.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>26</sup> Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 68; Ayātī, *Tahrīr*, p. 38; Song Lian, *Yuan shi*, Chap. 63, p. 1569. The Chinese text, translated in Emily V. Bretschneider, *Medieval Researches from Eastern Asiatic Sources* (London, 1988), vol. 2, p. 36, reads Beiting, which in Yuan times usually means Besh Baliq. Cf. Thomas T. Allsen, "The Yuan Dynasty and the Uighurs in Turfan in the 13th century," *China among Equals*, ed. Morris Rossabi (Berkeley, 1983), p. 254, who, following Abe Takeo, understood Beiting as referring to Qara Qorum. Allsen himself, however, recounts that due to this attack of Qaidu the Uighurs evacuated Besh Baliq, a measure they had no reason to take if Qaidu indeed attacked the much more northerly Qara Qorum. It is true that in Yuan times the name Beiting was also attached to a place in Mongolia in the vicinity of Qara Qorum (see the detailed discussion and references in Michal Biran, "China, Nomads and Islam: The Qara Khitai [Western Liao] Dynasty 1124–1218," [Diss., The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2000], p. 52, n. 54), but this was quite an unusual use. See the very hesitant discussion of Abe Takeo on the location of Beiting in his *Xi Huigu guo shi de yanjiu* (Urumqi, 1986), pp. 359–61, in which he does not even mention Qara Qorum.

<sup>27</sup> Rashīd/Alizādah, pp. 107–8; Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jami'u't-tawarikh [sic] Compendium*

The descriptions of this battle in the sources are extremely terse, but the desperate steps that Baraq took in its aftermath imply that he had suffered a serious reverse. Baraq fled to Samarkand and Bukhara, plundered the cities and employed their craftsmen around the clock to prepare new weapons, as he was trying to rebuild his army.<sup>28</sup> In the midst of his preparations, Qaidu's messenger, the Ögödeid prince Qipchaq, reached Baraq's camp with a peace proposal. The peace was offered in the name of the unity of the Chinggisid family, yet the sources stress that Qaidu's main motive for conciliation was his fear that the Chaghadaid Khan would trample Bukhara and Samarkand under the hooves of his horses.<sup>29</sup> Perhaps aware of his inability to defeat Qaidu on the battlefield, and with the encouragement of his governors among his sedentary subjects, Baraq accepted the proposal. The two princes decided to hold a *quriltai* (an assembly of princes) in the spring, and this took place either in Talas in the spring of 1269, according to Rashīd al-Dīn, or in Qatwān near Samarkand at an earlier date, around 1267, as implied by Waṣṣāf.<sup>30</sup> It was during this *quriltai* that Baraq presented his plan to invade Khurāsān.

At the *quriltai*, Qaidu appealed for unity in the name of the shared heritage of Chinggis Khan. Baraq claimed that, in the name of this same heritage, the Chaghadaids were also entitled to an appanage and pasture lands that others would not threaten. It was decided that two thirds of Transoxania (or its revenues) would be transferred to Baraq and one third to Qaidu and Möngke Temür, whose representative, Berkecher, also took part in the *quriltai*. The princes decided that henceforth they would dwell only in the mountains and plains and not in the cities; moreover, they would neither make exaggerated demands on their subjects nor graze their cattle in cultivated lands. The sedentary territories were entrusted to Mas'ūd Beg, the experienced administrator who served the Qa'an and afterwards the

*of Chronicles*. Trans. Wheeler M. Thackston. Central Asian Sources IV (Cambridge, Mass, 1998–9), p. 521 (Hereafter: Rashid/Thackston).

<sup>28</sup> Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 68; Ayātī, *Tahrīr*, p. 39; Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 25.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>30</sup> Rashīd/Alizādah, pp. 109–10; Rashid/Thackston, p. 521; Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 69; Ayātī, *Tahrīr*, p. 39.



Chaghadaids, with the charge to restore Transoxania to prosperity.<sup>31</sup> Summer and winter pastures were assigned to Baraq's troops. Qaidu and Baraq divided the military "thousands" (units of one thousand men)<sup>32</sup> and the artisan workshops—including those devoted to the production of weapons—<sup>33</sup> of Samarkand and Bukhara between the two of them, and this was probably the reward Qaidu demanded for defeating Baraq. Qaidu also stationed forces in the region of Bukhara to prevent Baraq's army from encamping there.

Dissatisfied with his expulsion from Bukhara and with his lot in the agreement, Baraq, who could not advance eastward or northward into his new allies' territories, proposed to traverse the Oxus the following spring. With this move, he intended to take possession of some of Abaqa's lands, which he declared to be areas that had been seized by force and not by virtue of inheritance.<sup>34</sup> The Chaghadaids might have had some older grudges against the Toluid Ilkhans,<sup>35</sup> yet Khurāsān, with its rich pastures, was clearly the most convenient direction for Baraq's expansion. Qaidu accepted his plan, surmising that whatever the consequences of the battle, it would benefit him: If Abaqa were vanquished, Baraq would be occupied in Khurāsān and much less concerned about Transoxania; were Baraq to be vanquished, so much the better.<sup>36</sup> Similar calculations probably also guided Möngke Temür, who approved of the *quriltai*'s decisions, despite the fact that at that time he was apparently committed to

<sup>31</sup> On Mas'ūd Beg see Thomas T. Allsen, "Mahmud Yalavach," *In the Service of the Khan*, ed. Igor de Rachewiltz et al. (Wiesbaden, 1993), pp. 128–30.

<sup>32</sup> The units mentioned are probably the forces which were stationed in those cities in Möngke's time and subordinated to the Qa'an or to other Mongol princes. See Waṣṣāf, *Ta'riḫ-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 51.

<sup>33</sup> For the workshops (*kārkhānah*) see I.P. Petrushevski, "The Socio-Economic Condition of Iran under the Mongols," *The Seljuq and Mongol Periods*, ed. John A. Boyle, vol. 5 of *The Cambridge History of Iran* (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 512–13.

<sup>34</sup> Waṣṣāf, *Ta'riḫ-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 69; Ayāti, *Tahrīr*, p. 39; Rashīd/Alizādah, pp. 109–10, 113; Rashīd/Thackston, pp. 521–2, 523; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, pp. 266–8. For the problems of Ilkhanid legitimacy see Thomas T. Allsen, "Changing Forms of Legitimation in Mongol Iran," *Rulers from the Steppes*, eds. Gary Seaman and Daniel Marx (Los Angeles, 1991), pp. 223–41.

<sup>35</sup> Though this did not prevent Alghu from cooperating with Hülegü against the Golden Horde. Peter Jackson, "Chaghatayid Dynasty," *Encyclopedia Iranica*, vol. 5 (1992), p. 344.

<sup>36</sup> Mīrkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, pp. 289, 293; see also Waṣṣāf, *Ta'riḫ-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 70; Ayāti, *Tahrīr*, p. 40; Rashīd/Alizādah, pp. 113–14; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 523; Rashīd/Bloch, pp. 173, 192; Rashīd/Boyle, pp. 142, 150.

maintaining a "peace" or "truce" with the Ilkhanate.<sup>37</sup> The *quriltai* was concluded with the princes exchanging gold cups with one another and addressing each other as *anda* (blood brothers).<sup>38</sup>

Yet despite the solemn ceremonies, the *quriltai*'s decisions were disregarded soon after it was held. Möngke Temür's army moved towards Transoxania, probably to take possession of the part to which he was entitled by the agreement (if not more). Qaidu sent his troops against Möngke Temür, and thereupon evacuated Bukhara. Baraq, who "saw the arena of his desires empty," rushed to reoccupy Bukhara.<sup>39</sup> Determined to invade Iran, and disregarding the *quriltai*'s other decisions, Baraq resumed the oppression of his subjects. He confiscated the local cattle, prohibited his subjects to ride horses, and killed all the oxen in order to use their skins for shields. Feeding his horses wheat and barley from the sown fields, eight *mann* per horse daily, Baraq soon caused a major depletion of the city's stock of foodstuffs.<sup>40</sup> Only with great difficulty did Mas'ūd Beg manage to convince him not to plunder Samarkand and Bukhara, pointing out that he had to secure his rear in case the Iranian campaign failed.<sup>41</sup>

#### *The Chaghadaid Invasion*

Yet Baraq had made preparations for his invasion of Iran even before entering Bukhara. Soon after the *quriltai*,<sup>42</sup> or perhaps earlier, in the

<sup>37</sup> On this "peace" see Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, p. 89.

<sup>38</sup> For a detailed description of the Talas' *quriltai* see Liu Yingsheng, "Lun Talasi huiyi," *Yuanshi luncong*, vol. 4 (1992), pp. 256–65; Biran, *Qaidu*, pp. 26–30. See the later source also for a refutation of the claim that this *quriltai* was an anti-Toluid alliance that enthroned Qaidu.

<sup>39</sup> Waṣṣāf, *Ta'riḫ-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 69.

<sup>40</sup> Waṣṣāf, *Ta'riḫ-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 71; Ayāti, *Tahrīr*, p. 39; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, p. 289. See also Rashīd/Alizādah, p. 114; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 523, according to which Baraq took over all the animals "from the provinces that belonged to Qubilai Khan and Abaqa Khan" (east of the Oxus), not sparing even plow oxen. Unfortunately, *mann* is a unit of weight which has different values in different places (from 1/485 kg to 128 kg), and therefore the amount of fodder per horse cannot be determined. See Muhammad Mu'īn, *Farhang-i fārisī* (Tehran, 1963), vol. 4, p. 366 for a list of the different weights.

<sup>41</sup> Waṣṣāf, *Ta'riḫ-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 71; Ayāti, *Tahrīr*, p. 39; Rashīd/Alizādah, p. 113; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 522; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, p. 289.

<sup>42</sup> Thus according to Waṣṣāf's description of the events (Waṣṣāf, *Ta'riḫ-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 69). Rashīd al-Dīn dated Mas'ūd's visit to winter 665/1266–7, i.e. before the

