

HANDBOOK OF ORIENTAL STUDIES
HANDBUCH DER ORIENTALISTIK

SECTION EIGHT
CENTRAL ASIA

edited by

DENIS SINOR · NICOLA DI COSMO

VOLUME SIX
WARFARE IN
INNER ASIAN HISTORY
(500-1800)



WARFARE IN
INNER ASIAN HISTORY
(500-1800)

EDITED BY

NICOLA DI COSMO



BRILL
LEIDEN · BOSTON · KÖLN
2002

Illustration on the cover: Chinese ink drawing of the Mongol general Sübötei Ba'atur (1176-1248).

This book is printed on acid-free paper

Die Deutsche Bibliothek – CIP-Einheitsaufnahme

Cosmo Di, Nicola:
Warfare in Inner Asian warfare / ed. by Nicola Di Cosmo. – Leiden ;
Boston ; Köln : Brill, 2002
(Handbuch der Orientalistik : Abt. 8, Zentralasien ; 6)
ISBN 90-04-11949-3

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is also available

ISSN 0169-8524
ISBN 90 04 11949 3

© Copyright 2002 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher.

Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by E.J. Brill provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910 Danvers MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change.

PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments vii

Introduction: Inner Asian Ways of Warfare in Historical
Perspective 1
Nicola Di Cosmo

PART ONE

THE MEDIEVAL PERIOD (500–1200)

Strategy and Contingency in the Tang Defeat of the
Eastern Turks, 629–630 33
David A. Graff

The Uighur-Chinese Conflict of 840–848 73
Michael R. Drompp

War and Warfare in the Pre-Činggisid Western Steppes
of Eurasia 105
Peter B. Golden

PART TWO

THE MONGOL AGE (1200–1400)

The Battle of Herat (1270): A Case of Inter-Mongol
Warfare 175
Michal Biran

Whither the Ilkhanid Army? Ghazan's First Campaign into
Syria (1299–1300) 221
Reuven Amitai

The Circulation of Military Technology in the Mongolian Empire	265
<i>Thomas Allsen</i>	

The Mongol Conquest of Dali: The Failed Second Front	295
<i>John E. Herman</i>	

PART THREE

THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1400-1800)

Military Aspects of the Manchu Wars against the Čaqars	337
<i>Nicola Di Cosmo</i>	

Fate and Fortune in Central Eurasian Warfare: Three Qing Emperors and their Mongol Rivals	369
<i>Peter G. Perdue</i>	

Military Ritual and the Qing Empire	405
<i>Joanna Waley-Cohen</i>	

General Index	445
---------------------	-----

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The idea for this book was first discussed with Professors Thomas Allsen, Peter Golden, and Reuven Amitai in Leiden, at the Symposium on "Nomads in Sedentary Societies" (2-3 July 1998), organized by Professors Anatoly Khazanov and André Wink at the Institute of Asian Studies (Leiden University). To Professors Khazanov and Wink, therefore, I am grateful for inviting me to the Symposium and making this first very informal consultation possible at all.

Further work for the planning and organization of the book was possible thanks to a period of research (Spring 1999) at the Institute for Advanced Study (Princeton, N.J.). The nurturing intellectual environment at the Institute has contributed greatly to a successful study leave, and I would like to recognize in particular the support of the members of the School of Historical Studies. My period of leave would not have been possible without the cooperation of the Department of East Asian Languages and Civilizations (Harvard University), and the generous financial assistance from the Dean of the Arts Faculty at Harvard University.

More recently, the University of Canterbury has provided technical and some financial assistance for the editorial work, for which I am very grateful. I am particularly indebted to the Marsden Fund of the New Zealand Royal Society, whose grant allowed me to reduce my teaching load for the purpose of completing this volume. The collegiality within the History Department cannot be quantified, but is nevertheless an invaluable asset. I thank my colleagues for it. I also thank Professor John McNeill, who generously donated his time to review parts of this book.

Since this book relied more than it is usual on the good will and sense of responsibility of the authors, I wish to express my heartfelt thanks to all the contributors for their efforts. They have made my editorial work a far more gratifying experience than I expected! Finally, I should thank the staff at Brill, in particular Patricia Radder and Albert Hoffstädt, for their patient and thoughtful assistance. Their cordiality and efficiency has been admirable.

THE BATTLE OF HERAT (1270):
A CASE OF INTER-MONGOL WARFARE*

Michal Biran

While Mongol campaigns of conquest in Asia and Europe have long caught the imagination of military historians, far less attention has been given to the inter-Mongol rivalries after the dissolution of the Mongol empire. This is not only because those conflicts seemed less engaging, but also because most of the inter-Mongol conflicts were merely raids or skirmishes which received only short notices in contemporary sources. In this context, the battle of Herat is an important exception.¹

When the armies of the Ilkhan Abaqa (r. 1265–1282) met the troops of the Chaghadaid Khan Baraq (r. 1266–1271) in 1270 at Herat in present-day Afghanistan, it was for a full-scale and decisive combat. Abaqa's victory secured Ilkhanid rule in Khurāsān and precluded any real threat to the Ilkhanate's eastern frontier for several decades. Baraq's defeat resulted in the loss of the independence of the Chaghadaids, who were obliged to submit to Qaidu (1236–1301), Ögödei's grandson. Considering the role of the Golden Horde behind the scenes, the battle thus involved the four Chingissid *uluses*, and was influential in shaping the borders of the independent Mongol khanates.

* This study was undertaken during the spring of 2000, whilst I was a fellow at the Institute of Advanced Studies (IAS) at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. I would like to thank the director and staff of the IAS for their assistance during this time. I would also like to thank my colleagues at the IAS, Prof. Reuven Amitai, Dr. Peter Jackson, Prof. David Morgan and Prof. Naomi Standen, as well as Prof. Elizabeth Endicott (Middlebury VT) and Dr. Yuri Pines (Jerusalem) for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

¹ Other major inter-Mongol battles include the wars between the Golden Horde and the Ilkhanate mainly in 1262 and 1265, about which see, e.g., Reuven Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks* (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 86–91; and the battle between the Central Asian Mongols under Qaidu and the Yuan forces in 1301, about which see Michal Biran, *Qaidu and the Rise of the Independent Mongol State in Central Asia* (Richmond, Surrey, 1997), pp. 52–4. The description of the battle of Herat in contemporary sources is, however, far more detailed than the descriptions of the above-mentioned battles.

This unique battle left its mark in historical records, both medieval and modern.² Yet, the military aspects of the battle have not yet been studied on the basis of the whole range of available sources. The works of the main Ilkhanid historians, Rashīd al-Dīn (d. 1318) and Waṣṣāf (d. circa 1328), whose descriptions serve as the basis for most of modern scholarship, devoted most of their attention to the Central Asian Mongols, who initiated the battle. Only through their works can one get the full political framework in which the battle took place.³ For the military aspects, however, the local chronicles and the Mamluk sources are no less useful. The most important local chronicle is Harawī's *History of Herat*, written c. 1330, which makes use of Rashīd al-Dīn's work but adds many details.⁴ Also valuable are the two chronicles of Kirmān, whose Sultan fought side by side with Abaqa,⁵ the more apocryphal Georgian chronicle,⁶ and the Arabic-Mamluk chronicles. As rivals of the Ilkhans, the Mamluks

² For the research literature see: Constantine A.M. D'Ohsson, *Histoire des Mongols* (The Hague, 1834, rpt. Tientsin, 1940), vol. 3, pp. 428–54; Henry H. Howorth, *The History of the Mongols from the 9th to the 19th Century* (London, 1888, rpt. New York, 1965), vol. 3, pp. 228–40; John A. Boyle, "Dynastic and Political History of the Ilkhans," in *The Saljuq and the Mongol Periods*, ed. John A. Boyle, Vol. 5 of *The Cambridge History of Iran* (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 357–60; Bertold Spuler, *Die Mongolen in Iran* (Leiden, 1985), pp. 61–4; A.P. Martinez, "Some Notes on the Il-Xanid Army," *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*, vol. 6 (1988), pp. 152–7; Biran, *Qaidu*, pp. 31–2.

³ For Rashīd al-Dīn see David O. Morgan, "Rashīd al-Dīn Ṭabīb," *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., vol. 8 (1995), pp. 458–9 and the references there; David O. Morgan, *The Mongols* (Oxford, 1986), pp. 13–14. For Waṣṣāf see *Ibid.*, pp. 14–15; Edward G. Browne, *A Literary History of Persia* (Cambridge, 1951), vol. 3, pp. 67–8. Shorter descriptions of the battle appear in other Ilkhanid sources: Ḥamdallāh Qazwīnī, *Ta'rikh-i Guzīda* (Leiden, 1913), pp. 577, 582; and the Arabic chronicle ascribed to Ibn al-Fuwaṭī (Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, *al-Hawādith al-Jāmi'a* (Baghdad, 1932–3), p. 357). I have also made use of the later Persian chronicle of Mīrkhwānd (d. 1498). Mīrkhwānd, who wrote in Timurid Herat, used Rashīd al-Dīn, Waṣṣāf and Harawī or his sources (see below). Yet he also preserved details about the Central Asian Mongols which are not to be found in earlier works (W.W. Barthold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion* (4th edition, London, 1977), p. 58).

⁴ Sayf b. Muḥammad Harawī, *Ta'rikh nāmāh-i Harāt*, ed. M. Šiddiqī (Calcuta, 1944), pp. 303–30. On Harawī see Šiddiqī's introduction to this edition, pp. 10–15. Martinez extensively used Harawī's work, though I am not in accord with his conclusions (see below, esp. pp. 202ff.).

⁵ *Simt al-'ulā*, written c. 1317, and especially the *Ta'rikh-i shāhī*, written c. 1317 or earlier. About those works see Bāstanī-Parīzī's introduction to: Anonymous, *Ta'rikh-i shāhī-i Qara Khitā'īyyān*, ed. M.I. Bāstanī-Parīzī (Tehran, 1966–7), pp. 1–19, 30–32.

⁶ *Histoire de la Georgie*, trans. M. Brosset (St. Petersburg, 1850), Part 1, pp. 573–86 (hereafter, *The Georgian Chronicle*). This source is used by Howorth, Spuler and Martinez.

showed interest in Abaqa's struggles in the east—struggles that kept him away from Syria—and their independent version of the conflict is therefore of interest. The most detailed Mamluk description of the battle of Herat appears in the work of the Syrian historian al-Yūnīnī (d. 1326), which is repeated, with several changes, in the later works of Ibn al-Dawādārī (d. after 1335) and Mufaḍḍal (d. after 1358).⁷ Another set of Mamluk sources provides many details about the Tegüder incident that preceded the battle, though not all of them connect it to the battle of Herat.⁸ One should bear in mind, however, that apart from Marco Polo's blurred version of this battle,⁹ all the sources originated in Herat or westward. The Chaghadaid version of the events therefore did not come down to us.¹⁰

On the basis of a close comparison between Arabic and Persian sources, this essay aims to reconstruct the background and course of the battle of Herat. This is followed, after a short discussion of the battle's results, by an analysis of the military aspects of the battle, in which I have tried to explain the reasons for Abaqa's victory, as well as to compare this battle to Mongol wars against "foreign" (i.e., non-Mongol) rivals.

⁷ On al-Yūnīnī and his sources see the introduction of Li Guo, *Early Mamluk Syrian Historiography* (Leiden, 1998), vol. 1, pp. 6–21, 60–80. None of al-Yūnīnī's extant sources mentioned there (e.g., Ibn Khallikān) is identified as the source for his information on the battle of Herat. On the relationship between the three Mamluk writers (al-Yūnīnī, Ibn al-Dawādārī and al-Mufaḍḍal) see Donald P. Little, *Introduction to Mamluk Historiography* (Wiesbaden, 1970), pp. 10–11, 33–6, 53–61. Shorter notices on the battle appear in other Mamluk sources, e.g., Baybars al-Manṣūrī (d. 1325), *Zubdat al-fikra fī ta'rikh al-hijra* (ed. D.S. Richards, Beirut, 1998), pp. 116, 121; MS BL Add 23325, fol. 77a, hence Badr al-Dīn al-'Aynī (d. 1451), *Iqd al-jumān fī ta'rikh ahl al-zamān*, MS Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmet III, 2912, fols. 100a, 104a; Shams al-Dīn al-Dhahabī (d. 1348), *Ta'rikh al-islām* (Beirut, 1999), vol. 52, p. 51; Ibn Kathīr (d. 1373), *al-Bidāya wa'l-nihāya* (Cairo, 1939), vol. 13, p. 255.

⁸ Baybars al-Manṣūrī, *Zubdat al-fikra*, p. 141, fols. 81b–82a; hence al-'Aynī, *Iqd*, fol. 106a; Ibn al-Furāt, *Ta'rikh al-duwal wa'l-muluk* (Beirut, 1942), vol. 7, p. 9; al-Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat al-arab* (Cairo, 1984), vol. 27, p. 396 (where Qaidu and not Baraq initiated the battle). Al-Yūnīnī and Ibn al-Dawādārī mention the incident as the background of the battle of Herat; Baybars and al-'Aynī mention it also before the battle but describe it in detail only after it, in 1274, and this later date is followed by al-Nuwayrī and Ibn al-Furāt.

⁹ Marco Polo, *The Book of Sir Marco Polo*, trans. Henry Yule (London, 1903), vol. 2, p. 66; Marco Polo, *The Description of the World*, trans. Arthur C. Moule and Paul Pelliot (London, 1935–1938), vol. 2, pp. 456–7. To the best of my knowledge, Chinese sources of the 13th–14th centuries do not mention this battle, being primarily preoccupied for those years with Qubilai's campaigns against the Song.

¹⁰ The only Central Asian source of this period, Jamāl Qārshī, does not

The Background: The Coming of Baraq into Central Asia

The battle of Herat was initiated by Baraq, the Chaghadaid khan who arrived in Central Asia only a few years before the battle took place. Yet the roots for Baraq's actions are to be sought not only in his immediate circumstances, but also in the two great Mongol succession struggles: the Toluid *coup d'état* of 1251, which promoted Möngke to the throne of the Qa'an, the supreme leader of the Mongol empire, at the expense of his cousins the Ögödeids; and the inter-Toluid rivalry that followed Möngke's death (1259), when his two brothers Qubilai and Arigh Böke contested the Qa'anate.¹¹

Möngke's accession led to the dissolution of the Ögödeid *ulus*, and greatly harmed the Chaghadaids, who had been the Ögödeids' allies. The Jochids, khans of the Golden Horde, whose leader was instrumental in enthroning Möngke, quickly manipulated Chaghadaid weakness, taking over Transoxania and Western Turkestan, formerly under Chaghadaid control. The Chaghadaid share in the empire's revenues was also taken over by the Jochids and the Toluids.¹² The Toluids were naturally the great beneficiaries of Möngke's rise. After his accession Möngke placed his two brothers Qubilai and Hülegü, Abaqa's father, in charge of China and Iran respectively. The two brothers expanded the empire's borders each in his own direction, thereby creating the basis for two new regional khanates.¹³


The Qubilai-Arigh Böke struggle that followed Möngke's death gave the deprived *uluses* of Central Asia a chance to restore the for-

mention the battle, yet he supplies the chronological framework for Qaidu and the Chaghadaid's succession. On him see Peter Jackson, "Djamāl Ḳarshī," *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., Supp. 3-4 (1981), p. 240.

¹¹ For these conflicts and their role in the dissolution of the Mongol Empire see Peter Jackson, "The Dissolution of the Mongol Empire," *Central Asiatic Journal*, Vol. 22, no. 2 (1978), pp. 186-244; for a detailed discussion of Möngke's accession and its consequences see also Thomas T. Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism* (Berkeley, 1987), pp. 18-44; for the struggle between Qubilai and Arigh Böke see Morris Rossabi, *Khubilai Khan* (Berkeley, 1988), pp. 34-5; Zhou Liangxiao, *Hubilie* (Jilin, 1986), pp. 46-65.

¹² Peter Jackson, "From *Ulus* to Khanate: The Making of the Mongol States c. 1220-1290," *The Mongol Empire and its Legacy*, ed. Reuven Amitai and David O. Morgan (Leiden, 1999), p. 29; Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 16; Jackson, "Dissolution," p. 207; Barthold, *Turkestan*, pp. 483-5.

¹³ Thomas T. Allsen, "The Rise of the Mongolian Empire and Mongolian Rule in North China," *Alien Regimes and Border States 907-1368*, ed. Herbert Franke and Denis Twitchett, vol. 6 of *The Cambridge History of China* (Cambridge, 1994), p. 394; Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 17; for more details on the conquests in Möngke's time, see, e.g., Allsen, "The Rise," pp. 403-7.



Map 1: The Mongol Empire after the Death of Möngke (1259)
(After Biran, *Qaidu* [Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 1997], 114).

tunes of their lineages. Taking advantage of the Golden Horde's pre-occupation with the Ilkhanate in the early 1260s, the new Chaghadaid Khan Alghu (r. 1261–66) took over the former Chaghadaid territories and much more, and consolidated his authority in the cities of Samarkand and Bukhara, formerly under the Qa'an. Switching his support from Arigh Böke to Qubilai, thereby largely facilitating the latter's victory, Alghu also gained Qubilai's confirmation to his rule over the territory stretching from the Altai to the Oxus.¹⁴ Qubilai was also obliged to confirm Hülegü's rule over the territory "from the banks of the Oxus up to the gates of Egypt," in order to gain his support. This confirmation was a major factor in the outbreak of hostilities between, on one side, Hülegü and his descendants, the Ilkhans, and, on the other, the Golden Horde, which had its own claims on parts of Iran.¹⁵

The Qubilai-Arigh Böke conflict also prompted Ögödei's grandson, Qaidu, to restore the dissolved Ögödeid *ulus*, whose territories had become, after Qubilai's arrangements, part of Alghu's territory. Unable to cope alone with Alghu, Qaidu turned to the Golden Horde for help. The Golden Horde Khan, Berke (r. 1257–67) was willing to cooperate against their common enemy. With Berke's aid, Qaidu managed to vanquish Alghu once, but was badly defeated in his second attempt. Only Alghu's death in late 1265 or early 1266 prevented Qaidu from paying a heavier price for this defeat.¹⁶

Alghu's death set the stage for Baraq's activities. Starting his career in Qubilai's camp in China, where his father had been banished in 1251 due to his pro-Ögödeid tendencies, Baraq won Qubilai's favor by performing "praiseworthy services" for him.¹⁷ Sometime

¹⁴ On Alghu see Barthold, *Turkestan*, pp. 488–92; Liu Yingsheng, "Ali Buge zhi luan yu Chahatai hanguo de fazhan," *Xinjiang daxue xuebao*, 1987, pp. 30–34.

¹⁵ Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jāmi' al-tawārīkh*, vol. 2, ed. E. Blochet (London and Leiden, 1911), p. 398 (hereafter: Rashīd/Bloch); Rashīd al-Dīn, *The Successors of Genghis Khan*, trans. J.A. Boyle (New York and London, 1971), pp. 255–6 (hereafter: Rashīd/Boyle); Mīrkhwānd, *Rawdat al-safā* (Tehran, 1961), vol. 5, p. 196; Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 23; Jackson, "Dissolution," pp. 208–35.

¹⁶ Mīrkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, p. 201; W.W. Barthold, *Four Studies on the History of Central Asia* (Leiden, 1956–1962), vol. 1, pp. 123–4; Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 22.

¹⁷ 'Alā' al-Dīn 'Aṭā'-malik Juwaynī, *Ta'rikh-i jahān gushā*, ed. M.M. Qazwīnī (London, 1912–37), vol. 3, pp. 64–5; 'Alā' al-Dīn 'Aṭā'-malik Juwaynī, *History of World Conqueror*, trans. J.A. Boyle (Manchester, 1958), vol. 2, pp. 591–2; Rashīd/Bloch, pp. 7, 169, 188; Rashīd/Boyle, pp. 23, 139, 151; Barthold, *Four Studies*, vol. 1, p. 125; Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 24.

after 1263 Baraq received Qubilai's permission to return to Central Asia.¹⁸ According to Rashīd al-Dīn, after Alghu's death Baraq gained from Qubilai a *yarligh* ('command' or 'order') appointing him as a joint ruler over the Chaghadaid *ulus* together with Mubārak Shāh (r. 1265–66). Mubārak Shāh was the son of Alghu's widow, Orghina, from her first marriage. She had chosen him to succeed Alghu, apparently without getting the Qa'an's permission.¹⁹ By sending Baraq, Qubilai hoped to secure his interests in the Chaghadaid *ulus*, and to have an ally against Qaidu, who refused to accept his authority.²⁰ When Baraq arrived in Central Asia, and found out that Orghina and Mubārak Shāh had firmly established their power, he kept the decree in his possession a secret, and presented himself as a refugee seeking to return to his original appanage. Mubārak Shāh allowed him to settle on his patrimonial appanage in the Chaghāniyān region, near Tirmidh, on the banks of the Oxus. Baraq gradually won the loyalty of the members of Mubārak Shāh's army, and eventually deposed him, degrading him to the rank of a hunting inspector.²¹ Rashīd al-Dīn's description is, however, incompatible with Jamāl Qarshī's dates. According to Qarshī, the only Central Asian source for those events, Mubārak Shāh was enthroned in March 1266, and deposed by Baraq in September of the same year.²² If those dates are correct, then Baraq must have arrived in Central Asia before Alghu's death, and indeed Rashīd al-Dīn mentions that he asked Qubilai for permission to leave after the surrender of Arigh Böke, in 1264.²³ It is hard to determine whether and when he received Qubilai's decree, which is not mentioned at all in the *Yuan shi*, the official history of the Yuan dynasty. Since Baraq turned against the

¹⁸ Song Lian, *Yuan shi* (Beijing, 1976), vol. 1, chap. 5, p. 91.

¹⁹ Rashīd/Bloch, p. 188; Rashīd/Boyle, p. 151; Barthold, *Four Studies*, vol. 1, p. 125; Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 24.

²⁰ Rashīd/Bloch, p. 189; Rashīd/Boyle, p. 151; Ibn Faḍlallāh al-'Umarī, *Das Mongolische Weltreich: al-'Umarī's Darstellung der mongolischen Reiche in seinem Werk Masālik al-abṣār fi mamālik al-amṣār*, ed. and trans. K. Lech (Wiesbaden, 1968), p. 2.

²¹ Rashīd/Bloch, p. 169; Rashīd/Boyle, pp. 139–40; 'Abd Allāh b. Faḍlallāh Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf* (Tehran, 1959–60), pp. 16, 67; 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad Ayātī, *Tahrīr-i ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf* (Tehran, 1967), pp. 5, 37; Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 24. Mubārak Shāh's exact title was *muqaddam bārschiyān*, the inspector of those who hunt with cheetahs. See Gerhard Doerfer, *Türkische und mongolische Elemente im Neupersischen* (Wiesbaden, 1963–74), vol. 2, p. 238.

²² Jamāl Qarshī, *Mulḥaqāt al-Surāḥ* in V.V. Bartold, *Turkestan v epokhu 'mongol'skogo nashestiya* (St. Petersburg, 1900), vol. 1 (texts), p. 138.

²³ Rashīd/Bloch, p. 189; Rashīd/Boyle, p. 151.

Qa'an's troops immediately after Mubarak Shāh's banishment, it is unlikely that the decree played a decisive role in his attaining the Chaghadaid leadership.²⁴

If Qubilai expected Baraq to represent his interests faithfully, he was to be disappointed: Baraq's first action as the Chaghadaid Khan was to defeat Qubilai's garrison in Khotan, in east Turkestan, and plunder the city. Yet in 1268 Baraq received a grant from Qubilai, who probably still hoped to secure his alliance against Qaidu.²⁵ Baraq, however, had his own reasons for confronting Qaidu. First, in trying to revive the dissolved territory of the Ögödeid *ulus*, Qaidu took over territories that were allocated by Qubilai to Alghu, i.e., the Chaghadaid lineage. More concretely, around 1268, after an abortive attempt to invade Besh Baliq, Qaidu was compelled to retreat westwards, evacuating Almaliq and withdrawing more than a thousand kilometers westwards. Having moved west of Talas, he was getting dangerously close to Baraq.²⁶ Fearing that Qaidu had set his sights on Samarkand and Bukhara, Baraq decided to attack him. Setting an ambush for Qaidu's forces, Baraq inflicted a crushing defeat on Qaidu on the banks of the Jaxartes. Again Qaidu turned for assistance to the Golden Horde, whose new ruler, Möngke Temür (r. 1267–80), perhaps fearing the rise of a second Alghu, sent his uncle, Berkecher, to Qaidu's help with allegedly 50,000 men. With their support Qaidu was able to defeat Baraq near Khojand, on the banks of the Jaxartes, and apparently overran Transoxania.²⁷

²⁴ Biran, *Qaidu*, pp. 24–5.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 68; Ayātī, *Tahrir*, p. 38; Song Lian, *Yuan shi*, Chap. 63, p. 1569. The Chinese text, translated in Emily V. Bretschneider, *Medieval Researches from Eastern Asiatic Sources* (London, 1988), vol. 2, p. 36, reads Beiting, which in Yuan times usually means Besh Baliq. Cf. Thomas T. Allsen, "The Yuan Dynasty and the Uighurs in Turfan in the 13th century," *China among Equals*, ed. Morris Rossabi (Berkeley, 1983), p. 254, who, following Abe Takeo, understood Beiting as referring to Qara Qorum. Allsen himself, however, recounts that due to this attack of Qaidu the Uighurs evacuated Besh Baliq, a measure they had no reason to take if Qaidu indeed attacked the much more northerly Qara Qorum. It is true that in Yuan times the name Beiting was also attached to a place in Mongolia in the vicinity of Qara Qorum (see the detailed discussion and references in Michal Biran, "China, Nomads and Islam: The Qara Khitai [Western Liao] Dynasty 1124–1218," [Diss., The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2000], p. 52, n. 54), but this was quite an unusual use. See the very hesitant discussion of Abe Takeo on the location of Beiting in his *Xi Huigu guo shi de yanjiu* (Urumqi, 1986), pp. 359–61, in which he does not even mention Qara Qorum.

²⁷ Rashīd/Alizadah, pp. 107–8; Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jami'u't-tawarikh [sic] Compendium*

The descriptions of this battle in the sources are extremely terse, but the desperate steps that Baraq took in its aftermath imply that he had suffered a serious reverse. Baraq fled to Samarkand and Bukhara, plundered the cities and employed their craftsmen around the clock to prepare new weapons, as he was trying to rebuild his army.²⁸ In the midst of his preparations, Qaidu's messenger, the Ögödeid prince Qipchaq, reached Baraq's camp with a peace proposal. The peace was offered in the name of the unity of the Chinggisid family, yet the sources stress that Qaidu's main motive for conciliation was his fear that the Chaghadaid Khan would trample Bukhara and Samarkand under the hooves of his horses.²⁹ Perhaps aware of his inability to defeat Qaidu on the battlefield, and with the encouragement of his governors among his sedentary subjects, Baraq accepted the proposal. The two princes decided to hold a *quriltai* (an assembly of princes) in the spring, and this took place either in Talas in the spring of 1269, according to Rashīd al-Dīn, or in Qatwān near Samarkand at an earlier date, around 1267, as implied by Waṣṣāf.³⁰ It was during this *quriltai* that Baraq presented his plan to invade Khurāsān.

At the *quriltai*, Qaidu appealed for unity in the name of the shared heritage of Chinggis Khan. Baraq claimed that, in the name of this same heritage, the Chaghadaids were also entitled to an appanage and pasture lands that others would not threaten. It was decided that two thirds of Transoxania (or its revenues) would be transferred to Baraq and one third to Qaidu and Möngke Temür, whose representative, Berkecher, also took part in the *quriltai*. The princes decided that henceforth they would dwell only in the mountains and plains and not in the cities; moreover, they would neither make exaggerated demands on their subjects nor graze their cattle in cultivated lands. The sedentary territories were entrusted to Mas'ūd Beg, the experienced administrator who served the Qa'an and afterwards the

of Chronicles. Trans. Wheeler M. Thackston. Central Asian Sources IV (Cambridge, Mass, 1998–9), p. 521 (Hereafter: Rashīd/Thackston).

²⁸ Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 68; Ayātī, *Tahrir*, p. 39; Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 25.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ Rashīd/Alizadah, pp. 109–10; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 521; Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 69; Ayātī, *Tahrir*, p. 39.

Chaghadaids, with the charge to restore Transoxania to prosperity.³¹ Summer and winter pastures were assigned to Baraq's troops. Qaidu and Baraq divided the military "thousands" (units of one thousand men)³² and the artisan workshops—including those devoted to the production of weapons—³³ of Samarkand and Bukhara between the two of them, and this was probably the reward Qaidu demanded for defeating Baraq. Qaidu also stationed forces in the region of Bukhara to prevent Baraq's army from encamping there.

Dissatisfied with his expulsion from Bukhara and with his lot in the agreement, Baraq, who could not advance eastward or northward into his new allies' territories, proposed to traverse the Oxus the following spring. With this move, he intended to take possession of some of Abaqa's lands, which he declared to be areas that had been seized by force and not by virtue of inheritance.³⁴ The Chaghadaids might have had some older grudges against the Toluid Ilkhans,³⁵ yet Khurāsān, with its rich pastures, was clearly the most convenient direction for Baraq's expansion. Qaidu accepted his plan, surmising that whatever the consequences of the battle, it would benefit him: If Abaqa were vanquished, Baraq would be occupied in Khurāsān and much less concerned about Transoxania; were Baraq to be vanquished, so much the better.³⁶ Similar calculations probably also guided Möngke Temür, who approved of the *quriltai*'s decisions, despite the fact that at that time he was apparently committed to

maintaining a "peace" or "truce" with the Ilkhanate.³⁷ The *quriltai* was concluded with the princes exchanging gold cups with one another and addressing each other as *anda* (blood brothers).³⁸

Yet despite the solemn ceremonies, the *quriltai*'s decisions were disregarded soon after it was held. Möngke Temür's army moved towards Transoxania, probably to take possession of the part to which he was entitled by the agreement (if not more). Qaidu sent his troops against Möngke Temür, and thereupon evacuated Bukhara. Baraq, who "saw the arena of his desires empty," rushed to reoccupy Bukhara.³⁹ Determined to invade Iran, and disregarding the *quriltai*'s other decisions, Baraq resumed the oppression of his subjects. He confiscated the local cattle, prohibited his subjects to ride horses, and killed all the oxen in order to use their skins for shields. Feeding his horses wheat and barley from the sown fields, eight *mann* per horse daily, Baraq soon caused a major depletion of the city's stock of foodstuffs.⁴⁰ Only with great difficulty did Mas'ūd Beg manage to convince him not to plunder Samarkand and Bukhara, pointing out that he had to secure his rear in case the Iranian campaign failed.⁴¹

The Chaghadaid Invasion

Yet Baraq had made preparations for his invasion of Iran even before entering Bukhara. Soon after the *quriltai*,⁴² or perhaps earlier, in the

³¹ On Mas'ūd Beg see Thomas T. Allsen, "Mahmud Yalavach," *In the Service of the Khan*, ed. Igor de Rachewiltz et al. (Wiesbaden, 1993), pp. 128–30.

³² The units mentioned are probably the forces which were stationed in those cities in Möngke's time and subordinated to the Qa'an or to other Mongol princes. See Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 51.

³³ For the workshops (*kārkhānah*) see I.P. Petrushevski, "The Socio-Economic Condition of Iran under the Mongols," *The Saljuq and Mongol Periods*, ed. John A. Boyle, vol. 5 of *The Cambridge History of Iran* (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 512–13.

³⁴ Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 69; Ayāṭī, *Tahrīr*, p. 39; Rashīd/Alizādah, pp. 109–10, 113; Rashīd/Thackston, pp. 521–2, 523; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, pp. 266–8. For the problems of Ilkhanid legitimacy see Thomas T. Allsen, "Changing Forms of Legitimation in Mongol Iran," *Rulers from the Steppes*, eds. Gary Seaman and Daniel Marx (Los Angeles, 1991), pp. 223–41.

³⁵ Though this did not prevent Alghu from cooperating with Hülegü against the Golden Horde. Peter Jackson, "Chaghatayid Dynasty," *Encyclopedia Iranica*, vol. 5 (1992), p. 344.

³⁶ Mīrkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, pp. 289, 293; see also Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 70; Ayāṭī, *Tahrīr*, p. 40; Rashīd/Alizādah, pp. 113–14; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 523; Rashīd/Bloch, pp. 173, 192; Rashīd/Boyle, pp. 142, 150.

³⁷ On this "peace" see Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, p. 89.

³⁸ For a detailed description of the Talas' *quriltai* see Liu Yingsheng, "Lun Talasi huiyi," *Yuanshi luncong*, vol. 4 (1992), pp. 256–65; Biran, *Qaidu*, pp. 26–30. See the later source also for a refutation of the claim that this *quriltai* was an anti-Toluid alliance that enthroned Qaidu.

³⁹ Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 69.

⁴⁰ Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 71; Ayāṭī, *Tahrīr*, p. 39; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, p. 289. See also Rashīd/Alizādah, p. 114; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 523, according to which Baraq took over all the animals "from the provinces that belonged to Qubilai Khan and Abaqa khan" (east of the Oxus), not sparing even plow oxen. Unfortunately, *mann* is a unit of weight which has different values in different places (from 1/485 kg to 128 kg), and therefore the amount of fodder per horse cannot be determined. See Muhammad Mu'īn, *Farhang-i fārisi* (Tehran, 1963), vol. 4, p. 366 for a list of the different weights.

⁴¹ Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 71; Ayāṭī, *Tahrīr*, p. 39; Rashīd/Alizādah, p. 113; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 522; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, p. 289.

⁴² Thus according to Waṣṣāf's description of the events (Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 69). Rashīd al-Dīn dated Mas'ūd's visit to winter 665/1266–7, i.e. before the

summer of 1268, he sent Mas'ūd Beg to Abaqa, apparently to take care of matters relating to the appanages of Qaidu and Baraq in Iran, as well as to express friendship and loyalty.⁴³ Mas'ūd's real mission, however, was to spy out the land, especially the roads and the size of Abaqa's armies.⁴⁴ After a short stay at the Ilkhanid court, fearing that the real motive of his visit had been discovered, he asked permission to leave. Abaqa regretted this permission soon after he gave it, but Mas'ūd, who had taken the precaution of leaving two horses at each post station through which he had passed, managed to cross the Oxus before Abaqa's troops could reach him. After hearing his envoy's report, Baraq's eagerness to invade Iran grew considerably.⁴⁵

Another step Baraq took in 1267–8 was to contact Tegüder—the Chaghadaid prince who had accompanied Hülegü when the latter went to Iran and had stayed in the Ilkhanate ever since—who was the commander of a *tümen*, a military unit of nominally 10,000 men. During the mission of Mas'ūd Beg or shortly afterwards, Baraq's envoys presented to Tegüder a special hollow arrow, in the middle of which a letter was hidden. In the letter, Baraq informed Tegüder of his intention to invade Iran and asked for his help, perhaps even proposing to reward Tegüder by appointing him over Khurāsān and Māzandarān after they had vanquished Abaqa.⁴⁶

According to Harawī, during the same mission Baraq also informed Abaqa that he planned to arrive in Khurāsān, and promised to be

quriltai, but he claimed that Mas'ūd came as an envoy of Baraq and Qaidu (Rashīd/'Alizādah, p. 105; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 519). Since the cooperation between the two began only after the *quriltai*, it seems much probable that it took place after it. Mirkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, p. 289 gives 660/1261–2 as the date of Mas'ūd's visit, which is certainly too early.

⁴³ Rashīd/'Alizādah, p. 105; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 519. For the rights and appanages of Chinggisid princes in the different Mongol *uluses* see Jackson, "From Ulus to Khanate," pp. 12–38.

⁴⁴ Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 69.

⁴⁵ Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 70; Rashīd/'Alizādah, p. 105; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 519.

⁴⁶ Rashīd/'Alizādah, p. 111; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 522 (who translated *tümen* as a division); Mirkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, p. 290; Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, pp. 71–2; Harawī, *Herat*, p. 306. Baybars al-Manṣūrī, *Ḍubda*, fol. 81b estimated Tegüder's forces as 30,000 men; *The Georgian chronicle*, p. 576 gives him 20,000 men; Grigor of Akanc' (should be Akner), "History of the Nation of Archers," trans. Richard N. Fryc and Robert P. Blake, *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, vol. 12, no. 2 (December, 1949), p. 375, speaks of 40,000 men and lots of wealth. Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar* (Freiburg-Cairo, 1971), vol. 8, p. 140, claims that Baraq asked Tegüder to join him in obeying Möngke Temür, the Khan of the Golden Horde.

his loyal vassal if Abaqa assigned him an appanage in Khurāsān.⁴⁷ According to Rashīd al-Dīn, after this mission Baraq contacted Tübshin, Abaqa's brother and his viceroys in Khurāsān, and demanded that he evacuate the region of Bādghīs up to Ghazna and the Indus River, which he defined as his forefathers' realm. Baraq had a point there: the region of Ghazna and Afghanistan as far as Sind was taken away from the Chaghadaids and annexed to Hülegü's realm only in Möngke's time.⁴⁸ Tübshin transmitted the message to Abaqa, who fiercely declined the offer, stating that he had inherited this territory from his father and was ready to defend it.⁴⁹ According to Harawī, Abaqa offered Ghazna to Baraq, on the conditions that he remitted half of its income to the Ilkhanate's treasury and that Abaqa still owned half of its artisans.⁵⁰ Whatever Abaqa replied, it did not satisfy Baraq, who was determined to fight.⁵¹

As for Tegüder, after reading Baraq's letter, he asked permission from Abaqa to return to his appanage in Georgia, intending to join Baraq via Darband, crossing through the Golden Horde's domains. He spent enough time there to outrage the Georgians and the Armenians by pillaging villages and caravans and especially by harassing the local Christian clergy.⁵² Due to the Armenians' complaints, or to his discovery of Tegüder's correspondence with Baraq, or perhaps as a result of the reports about Baraq's deploying his armies near the Oxus, Abaqa summoned Tegüder to his court several times.⁵³ When Tegüder refused to comply, Abaqa decided to attack him first, despite Baraq's impending threat. He sent two of his senior commanders, Shiremün and Abatai, to pursue Tegüder with their armies.⁵⁴ According to the Mamluk sources, Abaqa also summoned his troops from Anatolia,⁵⁵ and both the Mamluk historian al-Yūnīnī and the

⁴⁷ Harawī, *Herat*, pp. 307–8.

⁴⁸ J. Aubin, "L'ethnogenese des Qaraunas," *Turcica*, vol. 1 (1969), p. 79; see also Rashīd/Boyle, p. 139, recording the death of Baraq's grandfather in Bāmyān.

⁴⁹ Rashīd/'Alizādah, p. 112; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 523.

⁵⁰ Harawī, *Herat*, p. 309; the artisans' main function was making weapons.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² Grigor of Akner, p. 375.

⁵³ *Ibid.* Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vol. 8, pp. 140–41; al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl min'āt al-zamān* (Hyderabad, 1954–61), vol. 2, pp. 410–11; Rashīd/'Alizādah, p. 112; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 522; Mirkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, pp. 290–1.

⁵⁴ Rashīd/'Alizādah, p. 112; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 522; Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 72; Ayāū, *Tahrīr*, p. 41; Mirkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, pp. 290–1; Al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, pp. 410–11; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vol. 8, p. 140.

⁵⁵ Al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, pp. 410–11; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vol. 8,

Armenian chronicler Grigor of Akner mention the participation of Georgian and Armenian units in the Ilkhanid force.⁵⁶ The incident was therefore a clash of a wider scale than can be gleaned from the Ilkhanid sources alone. After a bad start, the Ilkhanid troops had defeated Tegüder and blocked his way to Darband. Tegüder retreated into the mountains of Georgia, but got lost in the forest. He found a temporary refuge with the Georgian King David, but soon afterwards decided to beg for Abaqa's mercy.⁵⁷ Alternatively, Tegüder was brought to Abaqa by Shiremün, who defeated him in a second battle.⁵⁸ According to Rashīd al-Dīn, Tegüder surrendered in April-May, 1270, but was brought to Abaqa only later,⁵⁹ after having been exiled to the Kibūdān isle in lake Urmīyah, west of Tabriz. After he defeated Baraq, Abaqa pardoned Tegüder but deprived him of any real power. Tegüder's commanders, who according to Tegüder had persuaded him to rebel, were executed, and his troops, divided into units of tens and hundreds, were incorporated in the Ilkhanid army. Tegüder was not allowed to hold a bow or to ride a mature horse, limitations he dutifully observed.⁶⁰

This was not perhaps the help Baraq had anticipated from Tegüder, but certainly the engagement of part of Abaqa's troops in the west facilitated his next moves. Having declined Abaqa's proposals and being determined to fight, Baraq asked for Qaidu's assistance despite his blatant breaches of the *quriltai*'s decisions. Qaidu agreed to Baraq's request, hoping to push him into Abaqa's hands, as the sources clearly indicate.⁶¹ He sent to his assistance two Ögödeid princes, the

pp. 140-1; Bybars al-Manṣūrī, *Ḥubda*, fols. 81b-82a; al-'Aynī, *ʿIqd*, fol. 106a; Ibn al-Furāt, *Ta'rikh*, vol. 7, p. 9.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* Grigor of Akner, p. 377.

⁵⁷ *The Georgian Chronicle*, p. 583; Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 72; Ayāṭī, *Tahrīr*, p. 42; al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, loc. cit.; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, loc. cit. This was either because he had found that the Georgians plotted to kill him, or because his remaining horses were poisoned in the Georgian woods.

⁵⁸ Rashīd/Alizadah, pp. 112-3; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 523; Harawī, *Herat*, p. 309 retained a different version, according to which Tegüder declined Baraq's offer to support him, and warned him against challenging Abaqa's numerous army.

⁵⁹ Rashīd/Alizadah, pp. 112-13, where he said Tegüder was brought to Abaqa in Rabī' al-awwal of that year, i.e., six months earlier. Rashīd must have been referring to Rabī' al-awwal of the following year (October-November, 1270), as indeed given in Thackston's translation (Rashīd/Thackston, p. 523).

⁶⁰ Baybars al-Manṣūrī, *Ḥubda*, loc. cit.; al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, loc. cit.; Rashīd/Alizadah, p. 113; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 523; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, p. 291; Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 72; Ayāṭī, *Tahrīr*, p. 42.

⁶¹ Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 70; Ayāṭī, *Tahrīr*, p. 40; Rashīd/Alizadah, pp.

aforementioned Qipchaq as well as Chabat, grandson of Güyüg Qa'an, with 2000 horsemen each, and possibly, according to Waṣṣāf, a few more princes. At the same time Qaidu ordered his men to find an excuse and return to him before the battle actually started.⁶² Baraq placed Qaidu's troops in his vanguard⁶³ and crossed the Oxus in late 1269-early 1270 (according to Rashīd al-Dīn) or sometimes between September 1268 and August 1269 (according to Waṣṣāf, Harawī and the Mamluk sources). This was shortly after the *quriltai* took place, if Rashīd al-Dīn's chronology is reliable, and while Abaqa was still engaged with Tegüder.⁶⁴

Baraq advanced to Marūchaq, between Balkh and Herat, where Tūbshin and Arghun Aqa, the administrator of Khurāsān, were waiting for him. After a short battle, the Ilkhanid troops were defeated and chose to retreat to Māzandarān, informing Abaqa of Baraq's advance.⁶⁵ During this fight, a commander of thousand from Tūbshin's army, named *Sechektu, whose family formerly served Qipchaq's house (i.e., the Ögödeids) defected to Baraq's ranks, and joined Qipchaq, presenting him with fine Arabian horses. Qipchaq's keeping most of those horses to himself instead of offering all of them to Baraq annoyed Jalayirtai, one of Baraq's senior commanders. This dispute gave Qipchaq the excuse he needed to return to Qaidu. Baraq sent first his brother and then Jalayirtai with 3000 horsemen to pursue him, but they were unable to catch him. Soon afterwards, Chabat also found a chance to withdraw, although he lost most of his troops when he ran into Baraq's son in Bukhara. Baraq protested to Qaidu at the desertion of his forces.⁶⁶ Qaidu ignored Baraq, but

113-14; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 523; Rashīd/Bloch, pp. 173, 192; Rashīd/Boyle, pp. 142, 150; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, p. 293.

⁶² Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 71; Ayāṭī, *Tahrīr*, p. 40; Rashīd/Alizadah, p. 114; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 523; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, p. 293; Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 30.

⁶³ Harawī, *Herat*, p. 309.

⁶⁴ Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 70; Ayāṭī, *Tahrīr*, p. 40; *The Georgian Chronicle*, p. 582. According to al-Yūnīnī and Ibn al-Dawādārī, Baraq crossed the Oxus after he had heard that Abaqa caught Tegüder. They understood the whole battle of Herat as a by-product of the Tegüder affair. al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, p. 434; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vol. 8, p. 148.

⁶⁵ Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 72; Rashīd/Alizadah, p. 114; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 523; al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, p. 411. Harawī, *Herat*, pp. 309-10 claimed that Tūbshin and Arghun Aqa retreated without taking the field.

⁶⁶ Rashīd/Alizadah, pp. 115-19; Rashīd/Thackston, pp. 523-5; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, p. 299; Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 71; Ayāṭī, *Tahrīr*, p. 40.

he did send a message to Abaqa, informing him of Qipchaq's return. Subsequently, friendship existed between Qaidu and Abaqa, who called each other *ortaq* (friend, ally).⁶⁷

Despite the defection of Qaidu's troops, Baraq managed to take over and devastate large parts of Khurāsān, overrunning Badakhshān, Shaburghān, Ṭāliqān and Merv up to the borders of Nishapur, which his forces plundered on May 19, 1270, evacuating it on the following day.⁶⁸ Baraq continued to oppress his subjects in his newly conquered territories,⁶⁹ and even planned to plunder Herat. He became convinced, however, that it would be more useful to gain the support of its ruler, Shams al-Dīn Kart, who could help him win the assistance of other Khurāsāni rulers and subjects. Shams al-Dīn Kart, up to then an Ilkhanid vassal, was obliged to arrive at Baraq's camp and accept Baraq's authority. Baraq promised to appoint him as the governor of Khurāsān when Baraq troops continued further westwards. In the meantime, Baraq appropriated money, weapons and cattle from the city, and appointed his tax collectors and inspectors in its markets, workshops and mints.⁷⁰ Unimpressed by Baraq's destructive policies, however, Shams al-Dīn Kart managed to return to Herat, allegedly to collect auxiliary troops and provisions for Baraq. Actually, what he did was to take refuge in his castle at Khaysār, south-east of Herat, and wait for the arrival of Abaqa.⁷¹

Meanwhile, Baraq allocated pasturelands to his commanders: Bādghīs, the pastureland north of Herat, originally allocated to Qipchaq, was given to either Yasaur or *Misu-Mengu. Margha'ul, Baraq's leading commander, received the western area of Ṭūs in the direction of Nishapur, along the Herat river and its tributaries, near the bridge of *Chaghchaghān. Since he knew the roads, Margha'ul was supposed to lead the vanguard troops in the invasion of Iran. Baraq himself stayed on the rear at Ṭāliqān. Although he boasted that after Khurāsān he intended to conquer Iraq and Azerbaijan⁷²—

⁶⁷ Rashīd/ʿAlizādah, p. 117; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 525; see Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 31.

⁶⁸ Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 71; Rashīd/ʿAlizādah, p. 119; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 526; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, p. 294 (26th Ramaḍān, 668).

⁶⁹ Mīrkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, p. 294.

⁷⁰ Harawī, *Herat*, pp. 314–16; Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 98.

⁷¹ Rashīd/ʿAlizādah, pp. 119–20; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 526; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, pp. 296–7.

⁷² Rashīd/ʿAlizādah, p. 119; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 526; Harawī, *Herat*, pp. 304, 312, 313; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, pp. 288, 295, 296.

that is to take over the Ilkhanate—he was in no hurry to do so. In the meantime, he ordered his troops to let their horses graze in the meadows and to ride oxen and donkeys, so his army had been idle for a few weeks when the rumors about Abaqa's arrival began to spread.⁷³

The Coming of Abaqa and the Battle

Abaqa made serious preparations to deal with the Chaghadaid threat. He ordered his chief minister to prepare arrows, bows and lances,⁷⁴ and sent the commanders to assemble their troops and auxiliary forces.⁷⁵ Abaqa also ordered his brother, Yoshmut, who was stationed on the border with the Golden Horde, to join him with 10,000 soldiers.⁷⁶ According to Waṣṣāf, Yoshmut was sent earlier to the aid of Tübshin while Abaqa was engaged with Tegüder. After Baraq occupied Khurāsān, Yoshmut ran into him several times and suffered heavy losses.⁷⁷

Abaqa left Azerbaijan on April 27, 1270.⁷⁸ According to Rashīd al-Dīn he ordered his army not to pluck a single stalk from the fields,⁷⁹ yet the Mamluk sources assert that his troops grazed their horses in the sown fields throughout their way.⁸⁰ Abaqa's troops went from Azerbaijan to Mūghān, Ardabīl, and Sharūyāz, the future site of Sultāniyya. There Abaqa met a messenger sent to the Ilkhanid court by Qubilai Qa'an. The messenger, who had just managed to escape from captivity in Baraq's hands, reported that Baraq's men were constantly drunk, and that their horses had become useless (*qadaq*). Hearing this, Abaqa passed on.⁸¹ His troops reached Rayy,

⁷³ Rashīd/ʿAlizādah, p. 119; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 526; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, pp. 288, 295, 296. See also Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 71.

⁷⁴ Mīrkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, p. 299.

⁷⁵ *Ta'rikh-i shāhī*, p. 287.

⁷⁶ Mīrkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, p. 299.

⁷⁷ Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, pp. 72, 73; Ayātī, *Tahrīr*, pp. 41, 42.

⁷⁸ Rashīd/ʿAlizādah, p. 120; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 526 (The 4th of Ramaḍān, 668).

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, pp. 434, 435; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vol. 8, p. 148; Mufaḍḍal, *al-Nahj al-sadiq*, ed. and trans. E. Blochet, *Patrologia Orientalis*, vols. 12, 14, 20 (Paris, 1919–28), p. 521.

⁸¹ Rashīd/ʿAlizādah, p. 120; Rashīd/Thackston, pp. 526–7; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawdat*,

and then Qūmis, where they were accompanied by the troops of Tūbshin and Arghun Aqa, whom Baraq had driven away from Khurāsān. They continued to Rādkān and Nishapur, where the Sultan of Kirmān, Hajjāj, as well as other auxiliaries (apparently from Yazd) joined them. Together they continued southwards to Bākhaz, and were joined near Herat by the Georgian contingents.⁸³ Throughout the march, Abaqa concealed his presence among the troops, and gave orders to kill whoever divulged it.⁸⁴ This policy seems to have worked well, since Baraq doubted the arrival of Abaqa almost until the beginning of the battle.⁸⁵

After having traveled for fifty-five days from Mughān, Abaqa's troops were only at 5 days' distance from Baraq's. Abaqa and his commanders decided that the troops would carry their supplies for the five days' march already cooked in order not to light fire.⁸⁶ Then ten out of every hundred horsemen were ordered to move, half a day in advance of the main body, to collect information.⁸⁷ This vanguard, estimated at 5000 men, included also the Georgian troops of King David, and was headed by the Ilkhanid commanders Abatai and Shiktur.⁸⁸ Abaqa ordered them to kill every Chaghadaid soldier that they found on their way. They did so, until they closed in on Baraq's vanguard. Abaqa's advance troops caught the enemy contingent by surprise at dawn and annihilated it completely. They returned and reported to Abaqa that the distance between their

vol. 5, p. 300, where the messenger reported only about Baraq's actions in Khurāsān, not about their being unprepared for battle. al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, p. 434; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vol. 8, p. 148; Mufaḍḍal, *al-Nahj al-sadīd*, p. 521 for the road. For *qadaq* see Doerfer, *Neupersischen*, vol. 3, p. 420.

⁸² Rashīd/Alizādah, pp. 120–1; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 527; *Tarikh-i shāhī*, p. 288; cf. Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 300.

⁸³ *The Georgian Chronicle*, p. 580.

⁸⁴ al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, p. 434; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vol. 8, p. 148; Mufaḍḍal, *al-Nahj al-sadīd*, p. 521.

⁸⁵ Rashīd/Alizādah, p. 122; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 528.

⁸⁶ al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, p. 434; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vol. 8, p. 148; Mufaḍḍal, *al-Nahj al-sadīd*, p. 521. For the use of this means by earlier Mongol forces see Henry D. Martin, "The Mongol Army," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, no. 1 (1943), p. 50.

⁸⁷ al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, p. 434; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vol. 8, p. 149; Mufaḍḍal, *al-Nahj al-sadīd*, pp. 521–2.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*; *The Georgian Chronicle*, p. 580; This king David was not the one who gave refuge to Tegüder, but "The Big David" (David Ulugh), Abaqa's ally, who died soon after the battle. See W.E.D. Allen, *A History of the Georgian People* (London, 1932), pp. 114–18.

troops and Baraq's was a day and a half's journey.⁸⁹ This perhaps corresponds to Rashīd al-Dīn's report that when Abaqa was at Bākhaz, he sent a small group of 100 horsemen from Fāryāb, much further to the northeast, to check the enemy's movements. This group clashed with some of Baraq's troops, but managed to overcome them and to report back to Abaqa.⁹⁰

Abaqa then divided his troops into the standard three divisions—right, left and center—and sent Tūbshin to *Chaghchaghān, on the Herat river, against Baraq's vanguard commander Margha'ul, who headed 3000 men. Tūbshin ran into Margha'ul's troops, defeated them, and took back the booty the Chaghadaid army had previously collected from Khurāsān. Margha'ul managed to escape and inform Baraq, who withdrew his forces.⁹¹

According to Harawī, Baraq heard from Margha'ul about the arrival of the Ilkhanid troops, rode towards them and the battle began.⁹² Elsewhere, like Mīrkhwānd, Harawī also cites Rashīd al-Dīn's detailed and beautiful version. Margha'ul indeed reported to Baraq on the arrival of the Ilkhanid army, but (since it was headed by Tūbshin), Baraq was not sure whether Abaqa himself had also arrived in Khurāsān. Baraq then received a messenger from Abaqa, who suggested that he take over the area of Ghazna as far as the Indus river, i.e., the area that Baraq had formerly demanded from Tūbshin. Baraq considered the offer for a while, but after consulting his commanders finally declined it, and decided to fight, despite the contrary advice of his astrologer. He sent three spies (*jawāsis*) to find out whether Abaqa had indeed arrived in Khurāsān, as claimed in the message.⁹³

Abaqa advanced to Herat and sent his commanders to choose the battlefield, which goes to show that he was less than confident that Baraq would accept his peace proposal. While there, they caught

⁸⁹ al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, *loc. cit.*; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, *loc. cit.*; Mufaḍḍal, *al-Nahj al-sadīd*, *loc. cit.*

⁹⁰ Rashīd/Alizādah, p. 121; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 527.

⁹¹ Rashīd/Alizādah, p. 121; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 527; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 300. According to Harawī, *Herat*, p. 317, Margha'ul was stationed in Qarābāgh in Bādghīs; Abaqa's army was sent from Jām, north of Bākhaz, and was apparently led by Abaqa. This is also implied by al-Yūnīnī and Ibn al-Dawādārī (*loc. cit.*), according to whom Abaqa rode by night and suddenly found himself facing Margha'ul.

⁹² Harawī, *Herat*, p. 317.

⁹³ Rashīd/Alizādah, p. 122; Rashīd/Thackston, pp. 527–8; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, pp. 300–301.

Baraq's spies and brought them back to Abaqa, who decided to manipulate them. After discussing the plot with a trusted Mongol soldier, he sat on his throne, feasting with his commanders, and made sure that the spies, bound to the tent's pillar, could hear him. After a few hours, the man with whom Abaqa conspired arrived, and reported that the Golden Horde had used Abaqa's absence from Azerbaijan to invade his domains in great numbers. "If you don't hasten to return," added the messenger, "you will not find your camps or people." Abaqa declared that he would withdraw immediately and suspend the fight with Baraq until after the Qipchaq threat had been eliminated. He ordered his people to return at once to Māzandarān, leaving their tents behind. He then ordered the three spies killed, but made sure that one of them was able to escape. Then he and his troops decamped and moved to the *Jina (or *Khanbeh) plain, which was chosen to be the battlefield.

The spy who had managed to escape rushed to report the good news to Baraq. Baraq was overjoyed and the next morning rode towards Abaqa's deserted camps. Even the refusal of the people of Herat, following Abaqa's commands, to open their gates to the Chaghadaid army did not change his good mood. Baraq and his troops crossed the Herat river, pillaged the deserted tents of Abaqa's troops and camped south of Herat. Only the next morning, after riding some twelve kilometres (two *farsakhs*) did they suddenly see the plain full of Abaqa's army, and understood they had been tricked. Baraq camped next to the Herat river, on the banks of one of its tributaries, the (unidentified) Qara Su (black water).⁹⁴

Although the use of disinformation was not uncommon among the Ilkhans and their contemporaries,⁹⁵ this story is almost too convenient to be true. If one accepts it, however, it is worth noticing that to both Abaqa and Baraq a large-scale attack of the Golden Horde in spite of the "peace" between it and the Ilkhanate seemed quite plausible. Interestingly, the Mamluk sources also report that

⁹⁴ Rashīd/Alizādah, pp. 124–5; Rashīd/Thackston, pp. 528–9; Harawī, *Herat*, pp. 320–23; Mirkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, pp. 303–5; Boyle, "Dynastic and Political," p. 359; for the Qara Su (Mongolian: Black water) see also Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 73 (Āb-i siyāhī, Persian: black water); al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, p. 435; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vol. 8, p. 149; Mufaḍḍal, *al-Nahj al-sadīd*, p. 523 (*al-nahr al-aswad*, Arabic: the black river).

⁹⁵ See Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, pp. 139–55; and see his article in this volume: Reuven Amitai, "Whither the Ilkhanid army? Ghazan's first campaign into Syria, 1299–1300," p. 238.

Baraq came to attack the Ilkhanid troops only after he was convinced that Abaqa had already withdrawn. This rumor, according to this version, was spread by a Chaghadaid turncoat, at Abaqa's request. The man, an expert in scapulomancy, escaped to Abaqa's ranks after his divinations revealed Abaqa's future victory. Abaqa was encouraged by this prospect, and promised to give the diviner a village if his prediction turned out to be true. He also asked him to spread the rumor that he (i.e., Abaqa) had retired, thereby encouraging Baraq to attack.⁹⁶

When he found out that Abaqa's forces were still in Khurāsān, Baraq considered retreat, but was persuaded by his generals to resume fighting, despite his obvious disadvantages, namely Abaqa's choice of the battlefield, the poor condition of Baraq's horses, and the fact that the Ilkhanid army had cut the Chaghadaid access to water.⁹⁷ Despite all this, Abaqa's victory did not come easily. The battle began in the following day, July 22, 1270,⁹⁸ near the Qara Su river. Abaqa encouraged his troops, and again divided them into three divisions—left, right and center—whose composition, however, is far from clear.

Most sources agree that the right flank was held by Tūbshin and Hindu Noyan,⁹⁹ who were accompanied also by Samaghar, the Ilkhanid commander of Anatolia.¹⁰⁰ According to the Georgian Chronicle, however, Shiktur, Arghun Aqa and Ias Bugha (the Christian 'Abdallāh of the Arabic and Persian sources) as well as the unidentified *Togha-Bogha Djini manned the right flank,¹⁰¹ while Yoshmut held the left flank, whose composition is uncertain. According to Rashīd

⁹⁶ al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, p. 435; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vol. 8, p. 149; Mufaḍḍal, *al-Nahj al-sadīd*, pp. 522–3. For Mongol scapulomancy see William of Rubruck, *The Mission of Friar William of Rubruck*, ed. and trans. P. Jackson, ed. D. Morgan (London, 1990), p. 193 and n. 2.

⁹⁷ Rashīd/Alizādah, p. 127; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 530.

⁹⁸ Harawī, *Herat*, p. 330; Rashīd/Alizādah, p. 130; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 531 (The first of Dhū al-Hijja, 668).

⁹⁹ Rashīd/Alizādah, p. 127; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 530; Harawī, *Herat*, p. 326; Mirkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, p. 305.

¹⁰⁰ Rashīd/Alizādah, p. 127; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 530; Baraq indeed camped on the banks of the Qara Su, but the Ilkhanid troops to his west probably blocked his way to the main Herat river.

¹⁰¹ *The Georgian Chronicle*, pp. 580–1. According to the Mamluk source "Abdallāh the Christian" brought to the battlefield "churches and bells on strong camels." al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, loc. cit.; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, loc. cit.; Mufaḍḍal, *al-Nahj al-sadīd*, p. 524.

al-Dīn, the left flank was huge, as it comprised Arghun Aqa, to whom the armies of Kirmān under Sultan Hajjāj and of Yazd under the *atabeg* Yūsuf Shāh were subordinated, as well as Sonitai, Shiktur, Buriltai and 'Abdallāh Aqa.¹⁰² Harawī mentions only Yoshmut and Boriltai, Mīrkhwānd records Yosmut and Sonitai Noyan, and Waṣṣāf only reports the names of Shiktur and Arghun Aqa.¹⁰³ The Georgian Chronicle, according to which most of the aforementioned people were on the right, cites only Abatai and Shiremun on the left flank.¹⁰⁴ According to Harawī, Mīrkhwānd, and the *Ta'rikh-i shāhī*, Arghun Aqa and the Kirmānid forces were positioned in the center,¹⁰⁵ which, according to Rashīd al-Dīn, was held by Abatai Noyan and a group of commanders.¹⁰⁶ Abaqa himself was in the center, according to Mīrkhwānd and Harawī, but was persuaded to stand back, since he was supposed to be the target of the Chaghadaid attack.¹⁰⁷ For this same reason, according to the *Ta'rikh-i shāhī*, Abaqa chose to be on the left flank.¹⁰⁸ It seems as if Baraq's forces were also divided, but there is no reference to the composition of the different Chaghadaid units.¹⁰⁹

The different sources also differ with regard to the course of the battle, although all of them agree that at one point Baraq was close to winning. According to the *Ta'rikh-i shāhī*, Baraq started the battle with a dense barrage of arrows, which left many people wounded.¹¹⁰ This might be identical with Margha'ul's attack, which most sources described as opening the battle. Margha'ul, leading a thousand men,

¹⁰² Rashīd/'Alīzādah, pp. 125, 127; Rashīd/Thackston, pp. 527, 530, where the translation is not accurate regarding the affiliation of the Kirmāni and Yazdi troops.

¹⁰³ Harawī, *Herat*, p. 326; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, p. 305; Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 74.

¹⁰⁴ *The Georgian Chronicle*, p. 580.

¹⁰⁵ *Ta'rikh-i shāhī*, p. 290; Harawī, *Herat*, p. 326; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, p. 305; Nāṣir al-Dīn Munshī Kirmānī, *Simt al-'ula* (Tehran, 1949), p. 47 says that Arghun Aqa was with the Kirmānid troops.

¹⁰⁶ Rashīd/'Alīzādah, p. 127; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 530.

¹⁰⁷ Harawī, *Herat*, p. 326; Martinez, "Il-Xanid Army," p. 155; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, p. 305. He differentiates between the center's vanguard (*muqaddima-i qūl*), manned by Arghun Aqa and the Kirmāni forces, and the "regular" center.

¹⁰⁸ *Ta'rikh-i shāhī*, p. 290.

¹⁰⁹ Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 74; *The Georgian Chronicle*, p. 580; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, p. 305. Yet all those references are rather general. It is still possible that the Chaghadaid force was not divided, as implied, for example, by describing Margha'ul attacking "from left and right" (e.g., Mīrkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, p. 306).

¹¹⁰ *Ta'rikh-i shāhī*, p. 289.

galloped left and right, attacking and retreating and causing great havoc. With this force he managed to overcome 3000 Ilkhanid horsemen and even to attack some of the Ilkhanid commanders with his sword. Eventually, he was hit by an arrow and killed.¹¹¹ Margha'ul's death came as a major blow to the Chaghadaid army. Yet Jalayirtai offered to avenge his death, and Baraq, after warning him not to let Abaqa's troops ambush him, allowed him to go. With 4000 horsemen wearing mailcoats, who waged repeated attacks, Jalayirtai was able to defeat either Abaqa's powerful left flank¹¹² or his central division.¹¹³ At this point, Abaqa considered retreat,¹¹⁴ but was encouraged by Sonitai, his oldest commander, to continue fighting. Whether Sonitai simply told Abaqa that having 70,000 warriors at his disposal, he could spare 10,000 and still win the day,¹¹⁵ or whether Sonitai stirred the troops, asking them to fight for the sake of Chinggis Khan¹¹⁶—a cliché not very well suited to the battle's circumstances—or for their patron, Abaqa,¹¹⁷ in any case, Sonitai's intervention was crucial to embolden the Ilkhanid army.

Abaqa took the field himself, coordinating his left flank, which he sent Yoshmut to redeploy, and the other undamaged parts of his army. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, it took the Ilkhanid forces three assaults before they could defeat Baraq,¹¹⁸ and Waṣṣāf also mentions repeated Ilkhanid attacks on the Chaghadaids.¹¹⁹ According to Harawī,

¹¹¹ Rashīd/'Alīzādah, pp. 127–8; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 530; Harawī, *Herat*, p. 327; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, p. 306; al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, p. 435; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vol. 8, p. 149; Mufaḍḍal, *al-Nahj al-sadīd*, pp. 523–4. Martinez, "Il-Xanid Army," p. 153 claims that Margha'ul was shot by a crossbow. The Persian text of both Rashīd and Harawī has *tir-i charkh*. *Charkh* means crossbow, but also the celestial wheel, fortune and misfortune (F. Steingass, *Persian English Dictionary* (eighth ed., London and New York, 1988), p. 390), and indeed Thackston translated it as "an arrow of misfortune". According to Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 75, Margha'ul's death occurred at a later stage of the battle.

¹¹² Rashīd/'Alīzādah, p. 128; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 531; Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 74.

¹¹³ Harawī, *Herat*, p. 328; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, p. 306; *Ta'rikh-i shāhī*, p. 290.

¹¹⁴ Rashīd al-Dīn is the only source who plays down Abaqa's desperate situation at this stage. Waṣṣāf, Harawī, Mīrkhwānd and the Mamluk source all suggest that Baraq's forces nearly won the battle.

¹¹⁵ Harawī, *Herat*, p. 328; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, p. 307.

¹¹⁶ Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 74; Ayātī, *Tahrīr*, p. 43.

¹¹⁷ Rashīd/'Alīzādah, p. 129; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 530; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, p. 307.

¹¹⁸ Rashīd/'Alīzādah, p. 128; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 530.

¹¹⁹ Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 75.

Abaqa attacked from left and right, but Jalayirtai managed to hold out, pursuing the Ilkhanid troops, killing and wounding them. When, however, he tried to return to Baraq, he could not make it, having been encircled by another division of Abaqa's troops. Due to this ambush, Jalayirtai's troops dispersed. When Baraq saw that the situation was desperate, he entered the battle himself, attacking and retreating for a while before he was hit and left horseless. His desperate position, as he was lying on the ground and crying "I am Baraq, give me a horse," was missed by neither Rashīd al-Dīn nor Harawī.¹²⁰ Eventually somebody recognized Baraq, and gave him a horse. "With eyes full of tears and a heart full of ire," Baraq rode all the way back to Bukhara.¹²¹

Thereupon, Abaqa's troops pursued the Chaghadaids for two days.¹²² Some of them surrendered to Abaqa, some sought refuge in Herat and were killed by its population, and a few others were burned alive by Abaqa's troops.¹²³ The only Chaghadaid who was still fighting at this stage was Jalayirtai. He assembled the routed Chaghadaids, drove them eastwards towards the sands of Amuya, near the Oxus, and held his ground till the remnants of the Chaghadaids got away.¹²⁴ But while he was able to save some people, most of the Chaghadaids were in dire straits, and many of them drowned when they tried to cross a river, which may have been that of Herat or, more likely, the Oxus.¹²⁵ The Mamluk sources also claim that when the fleeing Chaghadaids dismounted, each of them hamstrung his horse with his sword, so that the enemy could not make use of it, unique behaviour which is neither known from other Mongol battles, nor corroborated by any other source.¹²⁶ Many or even most of Baraq's

¹²⁰ Rashīd/Alizadah, p. 129; Rashīd/Thackston, pp. 530-1; Harawī, *Herat*, p. 330.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*; Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 75; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, p. 307.

¹²² *The Georgian Chronicle*, p. 580.

¹²³ Rashīd/Alizadah, pp. 130-1; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 531; Harawī, *Herat*, p. 329.

¹²⁴ Rashīd/Alizadah, pp. 129-30; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 531. Martinez, "Il-Xanid Army," p. 155 describes Jalayirtai's actions as a second battle, in which the Chaghadaids won.

¹²⁵ al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, pp. 435-6; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vol. 8, pp. 149-50; Mufaḍḍal, *al-Nahj al-saḍīd*, p. 525, according to whom there was a large-scale drowning; Harawī, *Herat*, pp. 329-30.

¹²⁶ al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, pp. 435-6; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vol. 8, pp. 149-50; Mufaḍḍal, *al-Nahj al-saḍīd*, p. 525. Hamstringing horses was, however, known in pre-Islamic Arabia and in the early Islamic period (see e.g. Muḥammad b. Jarīr

troops perished in the battle, while Abaqa's losses were smaller, but still significant.¹²⁷

Results and Political Implications

Baraq's defeat sealed his destiny. In addition to his crushing defeat, soon after he reached Bukhara he was struck by paralysis, and had to be carried in a litter. Some of his commanders chose to join Abaqa, while two princes decided to ride eastward. Baraq sent loyal princes after the deserters, and dispatched his brother, Basar, to ask for Qaidu's assistance, describing his desperate situation and attributing his defeat to the desertion of Qipchaq and Chabat. Qaidu imprisoned the messenger, but informed Baraq that he would send troops to his aid. He then led 20,000 men westward, hoping to take advantage of the Chaghadaid weakness, and to prevent Baraq from joining Qubilai. Baraq learnt about Qaidu's approach only after his

al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh al-rusul wa'l-muluk*, ed. DeGoege (Leiden, 1879-1901), series 1, pp. 1476, 1614; M. Fishbein, trans, *The Victory of Islam*, vol. 8 of *The History of al-Ṭabarī* (New York, 1997), pp. 19, 156, relating to the years 626-7 and 629-30). A horse was hamstrung when its rider resolved not to attempt escape but to fight to the death, as is documented in a 9th century episode: During the struggle between the Caliph Harūn al-Rashīd's two sons, al-Amīn (r. 809-813) and al-Ma'mūn (r. 813-833), al-Amīn's governor of al-Ahwāz fought a losing battle against a strong contingent of al-Ma'mūn's army. When he realized that everything was lost, he offered the clients (*mawālī*) to run and save their life and let him fight alone till the bitter end. The loyal clients refused, pointing out that they owe him too much to abandon him at this stage. They therefore dismounted and hamstrung their horses so that they would not be able to change their mind (Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, series 3, p. 853; M. Fishbein, trans. *The War between Brothers* (New York, 1992), p. 117 quoted in David Ayalon, *Eunuchs, Caliphs and Sultans: A Study of Power Relations* (Jerusalem, 1999), p. 26. I am indebted to Prof. Reuven Amitai for this reference). However, already the late 10th century scholar, Khattābī (d. 998), commenting on the hamstringing of the horse of Ja'far b. 'Abd al-Ṭālib, the Prophet Muḥammad's cousin in the battle of Mu'ta (in 629-30, see the first reference from Ṭabarī above) explained the hamstringing as meant to prevent the enemy from making use of the horses of his defeated enemies. Khattābī also cited several Muslim legal opinions on the subject of hamstringing. Abū Sulaymān Khattābī, *Ma'ālim al-sunan* (Aleppo, 1933), vol. 2, pp. 253-4; partially cited in 'Azīm Ābādī, *al-Awn al-ma'būd* (Medina, 1968), vol. 8, p. 240; I am indebted to Prof. Michael Lecker and to Ms. Vardit Tokatli for those references.

¹²⁷ al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, pp. 435-6; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vol. 8, pp. 149-50; Mufaḍḍal, *al-Nahj al-saḍīd*, p. 525, according to whom Baraq lost more than 40,000 men, and Abaqa either 370, 390 or just "many many troops", part of them due to a disease; Harawī, *Herat*, pp. 329-30, where Abaqa lost 5000 men and Baraq most of his army.

princes had already caught the rebels. He tried to convince Qaidu to go back, to no avail. Qaidu's troops surrounded Baraq's camp, planning to attack him on the following day. In the morning, however, they discovered that Baraq had passed away during the night. Most of Baraq's troops, estimated as 30,000 men, chose to submit to Qaidu, who granted them pasturelands and shares of Baraq's wealth.¹²⁸ According to Waṣṣāf's alternative version, most of Baraq's troops chose to enter into Qaidu's service, while Baraq was still alive. Baraq was then obliged to seek refuge with Qaidu, who poisoned him.¹²⁹

Baraq died in August 1271, and less than a month later Qaidu was enthroned as khan at Talas.¹³⁰ Apart from being the Ögödeid khan, Qaidu was also empowered to appoint the head of the Chaghadaid *ulus*. In Central Asia, the battle of Herat thus led to the accession of Qaidu and to the loss of independence of the Chaghadaid *ulus*, which became subordinate to Qaidu.¹³¹ This did not happen without opposition: Baraq's and Alghu's sons rebelled against Qaidu, and so also did the newly appointed head of the Chaghadaids, Negübei. Yet after being defeated by Abaqa, and having their troops divided between Abaqa's and Qubilai's army, the Chaghadaids could not challenge Qaidu for long. Du'a, Baraq's son, acknowledged this fact and chose to ally himself with Qaidu. In 1282, Qaidu appointed him head of the Chaghadaid *ulus*, and their cooperation, which lasted till Qaidu's death (1301), enabled Du'a to organize the Chaghadaid *ulus* and regain its independence after Qaidu's death.¹³² Yet even before Du'a's accession, from the mid 1270s, Qaidu, thanks to the battle's outcome, was able to assert himself as the ruler of the independent Mongol khanate in Central Asia.¹³³ Another important advantage that Qaidu gained from Baraq's defeat was the alliance of Mas'ūd Beg, who after the battle moved into Qaidu's service. The cooperation between the two lasted till Mas'ūd's death (1289), after which his sons continued to serve Qaidu.

¹²⁸ Rashīd/Alīzādah, pp. 131–8; Rashīd/Thackston, pp. 531–5; Rashīd/Boyle, p. 153; Biran, *Qaidu*, pp. 31–2.

¹²⁹ Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 76; Ayāti, *Tahrīr*, p. 44; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, p. 309; Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 32.

¹³⁰ Qarshī, *Mulkhaqāt*, p. 138; Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 32.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, p. 130.

¹³² For the relationship between Du'a, Qaidu and Qaidu's sons see Biran, *Qaidu*, Chs. 2, 3.

¹³³ Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 33.

Together they presided over the gradual recovery of Qaidu's sedentary territories.¹³⁴

Abaqa's victory confirmed Ilkhanid control over Khurāsān, and for the remaining years of his rule, his eastern frontier remained quiet. Later on the Ilkhanids had to cope with local raids by Qaidu, the Chaghadaids, and the Qara'unas against Khurāsān and Herat, but apart from the invasions during Oljeitü's reign, the eastern border of Iran remained safe until the rise of Temür Lang (1370–1405).¹³⁵ Abaqa also took several steps that were meant to secure his eastern border. He was dissuaded from his original intention of destroying the disloyal city of Herat, but its ruler, Shams al-Dīn Kart, who had flirted with Baraq, remained suspect in Abaqa's eyes. In 1275, after several delays, Shams al-Dīn Kart was persuaded to go to Tabriz, the Ilkhanid capital, where he was detained and finally poisoned in 1278.¹³⁶ Even before that, a Chaghadaid appointee, who coveted Bukhara, reported to Abaqa that Qaidu and the Chaghadaids were fighting in the city, and claimed, apparently from his own imagination, that they were planning to cross the Oxus again. Abaqa sent his troops to invade and destroy Bukhara, so that nobody would wish to fight for it again.¹³⁷ The Ilkhanid force, which allegedly came to avenge the harm inflicted by Baraq on Khurāsān, reached Bukhara on January 29, 1273. Although they did not find in the city any Chaghadaid or Ögödeid troops, Abaqa's troops burned and pillaged for a week, reducing the city to ashes.¹³⁸ After this week, however, Abaqa's troops evacuated Bukhara. Despite their victory, the Ilkhanids did not try to expand beyond the Oxus, which remained their eastern border.¹³⁹

Another step that Abaqa took was to entrust the region of Ghazna to those Chaghadaids who joined his troops after the battle. This step was meant to curb the power of the Qara'unas,¹⁴⁰ who inhabited

¹³⁴ Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 32.

¹³⁵ Boyle, "Dynastic and Political," p. 360.

¹³⁶ Peter Jackson, "Abaqa", *Encyclopedia Iranica*, vol. 1 (1985), p. 62, and see Harawī, *Herat*, pp. 330ff. for a detailed description of those events.

¹³⁷ Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 77; Ayāti, *Tahrīr*, p. 45; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, pp. 311–12; Rashīd/Alīzādah, pp. 140–2; Rashīd/Thackston, pp. 536–7.

¹³⁸ Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 33. Sacked again in 1276 by Alghu's sons, Bukhara remained in ruins till 1282, when Qaidu sent Mas'ūd Beg to restore it.

¹³⁹ Martinez, "Il-Xanid Army," p. 152.

¹⁴⁰ For the Qara'unas, a group of Mongols who ruled over most of modern

this area, and to check further Chaghadaid pressure on Khurāsān. Abaqa, who had formerly offered this region to Baraq, after the battle appointed Mubārak Shāh, the former head of the Chaghadaids, to command the Qara'unid army of Ghazna. It is unclear to what extent the "Ilkhanid" Chaghadaids managed to rule the Qara'unas effectively. In the late 1290s, however, Du'a's troops took over the Qara'unas.¹⁴¹

Abaqa's victory cost him already, however, on his western front, against the Mamluks. Being busy in the north and east in 1268–70, Abaqa did not send troops to the help of Antioch, an Ilkhanid vassal state that in 1268 passed into the hands of the Mamluk Sultan Baybars. The Ilkhanid troops of Anatolia were by then busy with Tegüder in Georgia. For the same reason Abaqa also did not take steps to prevent Baybars's advance against the Crusaders in 1269.¹⁴² Moreover, Abaqa's involvement in Herat, and his attention to the eastern front, probably contributed to his failure to implement a real joint campaign with the Franks against the Mamluks. When the crusade of Edward, shortly to become Edward I of England, reached Acre in spring 1271, Abaqa sent to his help only a small and ineffective force that raided north Syria in October 1270, only to withdraw at the first indications of a Mamluk approach.¹⁴³ Taking all this into account, it is clear why the Mamluk sources chose to describe the battle of Herat.

What was the reaction of the other Mongol khanates to the battle's result? Soon after the battle, Qubilai's emissaries arrived in Marāgha to enthrone Abaqa,¹⁴⁴ reconfirming his rule over Iran, and demonstrating at least the nominal authority of the Qa'an there. Although he was mostly preoccupied in 1268–73 with the siege of Xianyang, in Central China, Qubilai was also aware of Qaidu's

Afghanistan and attempted to remain independent of both the Ilkhans and the Chaghadaids see Aubin, "Qara'unas," *passim*; Shimo, "The Qara'unas in the Historical Materials of the Ilkhanate," *Memoires of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko*, vol. 35 (1977), *Passim*; Jackson, "Dissolution," pp. 242ff.

¹⁴¹ Aubin, "Qara'unas," pp. 83–4; Jackson, "Dissolution," p. 242; Peter Jackson, "Chaghatayid Dynasty," *Encyclopedia Iranica*, vol. 5 (1992), p. 345.

¹⁴² Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, pp. 119–20.

¹⁴³ Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, pp. 98–9; L. Lockhart, "The Relations between Edward I and Edward II of England and the Mongol Ilkhans of Persia," *Iran*, vol. 6 (1968), p. 24; John A. Boyle, "The Ilkhans of Persia and the Princes of Europe," *Central Asiatic Journal*, vol. 20, no. 1 (1976), pp. 30–1.

¹⁴⁴ Rashīd/Alizādah, pp. 138–9; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 535.

strengthening and took precautions. Already in 1271 he sent a coalition of princes headed by his fourth son Nomuqan to Almaliq, in the upper Ili valley, to guard against Qaidu. The serious threat this coalition posed to Qaidu, however, collapsed in the middle of the 1270s, when the princes rebelled against Nomuqan and some of them even found their way into Qaidu's ranks.¹⁴⁵ Throughout his rule, Qubilai was unable to enforce his authority over the Central Asian Mongols.¹⁴⁶

Möngke Temür's messengers also came to greet Abaqa's victory.¹⁴⁷ Although he approved of Baraq's plan to conquer Khurāsān, and despite his diplomatic efforts to forge an alliance with the far away Mamluks against Abaqa, when the latter was faced by a real threat, that of Baraq, Möngke Temür remained neutral, choosing only to congratulate Abaqa after his victory. This was not only because in 1270 much of Möngke Temür's attention was concentrated on the troubles in Novgorod, the northern outlet of the Golden Horde trade,¹⁴⁸ but also because Baraq was no less a threat to Möngke Temür than Abaqa himself. The war, resulting in the curbing of the Chaghadaid force and the temporarily weakening of the Ilkhans, certainly suited Möngke Temür's interests. Nor did he have a reason to be worried by Qaidu's accession. Despite the tension between them after the Talas *quriltai*, Qaidu remained Möngke Temür's protégé at least till the mid-1270s.¹⁴⁹ Soon after his greetings to Abaqa, however, Möngke Temür renewed his attempts to ally with the Mamluks against the Ilkhans, though these never materialized.¹⁵⁰

The battle of Herat was therefore a major event that shaped the borders of the emerging independent Mongol Khanates and their international relations. Let us now turn to our analysis of the reasons for Abaqa's victory.

¹⁴⁵ For Nomuqan and the princes' rebellion see Biran, *Qaidu*, pp. 37–41.

¹⁴⁶ See Biran, *Qaidu*, pp. 37–57.

¹⁴⁷ Rashīd/Alizādah, p. 139; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 535; Mirkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, p. 308.

¹⁴⁸ Bartold Spuler, *Die goldene Horde* (Wiesbaden, 1965), p. 59; George Vernadsky, *The Mongols and Russia* (New Haven, 1953), pp. 170–1.

¹⁴⁹ Biran, *Qaidu*, pp. 63–4.

¹⁵⁰ Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, pp. 89–91.

The Military Implications: Why did Abaqa win?

A.P. Martinez has claimed that "the battle of Herat was decided by the Ilkhanid heavy cavalry," and considers the Ilkhanids' better weaponry, lances mostly, that allegedly distinguished them from the Chaghadaid "light" archers, as the main reason for their victory.¹⁵¹ This conclusion, however, can be disputed.¹⁵²

The Mongol army had used lances already at the time of Chinggis Khan¹⁵³ and certainly in the early 1240s, when Carpini and Thomas of Spalato described it.¹⁵⁴ Therefore, being armed with lances does not necessarily justify the classification of its users as "heavy cavalry." Moreover, Baraq's troops also carried lances during the battle of Herat, and their use continued to be common later on among Central Asian Mongols.¹⁵⁵ However, Baraq's insistence on making weapons around the clock in Bukhara, his confiscation of cattle for their skins as well as plundering weapons before and during the battle¹⁵⁶ indeed suggest that his armament was inferior to that of Abaqa, at least in quantity. This makes sense: after all Abaqa had a much larger and better organized kingdom at his disposal than Baraq had during his short rule in Transoxania. Yet I doubt whether the difference in the armament of the two sides was that great, or whether it was this alone that decided the battle. A close reading of the different sources suggests that the two armies used a number of weapons besides bows and arrows. Abaqa's forces indeed had lances, knives, javelins, and swords,¹⁵⁷ but Baraq's troops were also equipped

¹⁵¹ Martinez, "Il-Xanid Army," p. 155.

¹⁵² In general, cf. Martinez's evaluations of the Ilkhanid army cited above with those of J.M. Smith (J.M. Smith, "'Ayn Jālūt: Mamluk Success or Mongol Failure?' *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, vol. 44, no. 2 [December, 1984], pp. 307–345; J.M. Smith, "Mongol Society and Military in the Middle East: Antecedents and Adaptations," *War and Society in the Eastern Mediterranean*, ed. Y. Lev [Leiden, 1997], pp. 249–266) and R. Amitai-Preiss (Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, esp. Ch. 10; Amitai, "Whither the Ilkhanid army," p. 253ff.).

¹⁵³ See e.g., Juwaynī, *Jahān gushā*, vol. 1, p. 107; Juwaynī, *World Conqueror*, vol. 1, p. 134 (Chinggis Khan's army using lances against Jalāl al-Dīn); Robert W. Reid, "Mongolian Weaponry in *The Secret History of the Mongols*," *Mongolian Studies*, vol. 15 (1992), pp. 88–9.

¹⁵⁴ Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, p. 216; Reid, "Weaponry," pp. 88–9.

¹⁵⁵ Kirmānī, *Simt al-ūlā*, p. 47; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 287; Biran, *Qaidu*, pp. 86–7.

¹⁵⁶ *Ta'rikh-i shāhī*, p. 290; Harawī, *Herat*, p. 314; Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 68; Ayāti, *Tahrīr*, p. 38.

¹⁵⁷ Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, pp. 74, 75; Harawī, *Herat*, pp. 326, 328, 329; Mīrkh-

with swords, lances, and daggers.¹⁵⁸ Four thousand of them also wore mailcoats (*jawshan-i pūsh*).¹⁵⁹ Martinez concludes that less than five percent of the Chaghadaid force used armor.¹⁶⁰ I do not think that the numbers given in the sources (see below) enable one to calculate percentages with any hope of accuracy. Yet it is no less significant that, to the best of our knowledge, none of Abaqa's troops wore armor. Indeed, the 4000 armored Chaghadaid warriors managed to break up an important Ilkhanid division.

Despite all that, however, it is clear that the main weapon was still bows and arrows, and this is true for both sides. The barrage of arrows from Baraq's troops is well attested, and the Chaghadaids repeated attacks (or attacks and retreats) also suggest the use of arrows and not of hand to hand combat. The Ilkhanid forces, however, also made good use of arrows, with which, for example, they managed to kill Margha'ul, and with which Tūbshin and others damaged the Chaghadaids in the later stages of the battle.¹⁶¹ Only at the end of the battle did the Ilkhanid army turn to hand to hand combat, slaying the Chaghadaids with swords, as had also been common among the Mongols at the time of Chinggis Khan.¹⁶² During the battle, the

wānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 299; *The Georgian Chronicle*, p. 582; al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, p. 435.

¹⁵⁸ Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 71; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vol. 8, pp. 148–9; al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, p. 435; Kirmānī, *Simt al-ūlā*, p. 47; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 293. Amitai-Preiss (*Mongols and Mamluks*, p. 255) had questioned the reliability of Waṣṣāf's descriptions of arms, defining them as mainly poetical. There might be some truth in this accusation (though Waṣṣāf certainly demonstrates a rich collection of metaphors describing bows and arrows), but the mentioning of diverse weapons in the different sources suggests that at least some of them were real, not imaginative.

¹⁵⁹ Harawī, *Herat*, p. 328. For later examples of Chaghadaid forces using armor see Harawī, *Herat*, p. 630; Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, *Voyages d'Ibn Baṭṭūṭa*, ed. and trans. C. Defremery and B.R. Sanguinetti (Paris, 1969), p. 49; Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, *The Travels of Ibn Baṭṭūṭa*, trans. Hamilton A.R. Gibb (Cambridge, 1958–1994), vol. 3, p. 566.

¹⁶⁰ Martinez, "Il-Xanid Army," p. 155.

¹⁶¹ Rashīd/Alizādah, pp. 127, 131; Rashīd/Thackston, pp. 530, 531; Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, pp. 74, 75; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 307; Harawī, *Herat*, p. 326; al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, p. 435; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vol. 8, p. 149 and see also the poetic description of the battles in which bows and arrows have a central position. Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, pp. 74, 75; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 305; Harawī, *Herat*, pp. 328–9.

¹⁶² al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, p. 435; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vol. 8, p. 149; Mufaddal, *al-Nahj al-sadīd*, p. 524; for earlier examples from Chinggis Khan's time see, e.g., Rashīd/Thackston, pp. 44, 243; Bar Hebraeus, *The Chronography of Gregory Abū 'l-Faraj*, ed. and trans. E.A.W. Budge (London, 1932), vol. 1, p. 376; also Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, p. 223.

Ilkhanids also conducted repeated attacks in order to break the Chaghadaids' force. More important, their final victory was achieved after they had managed to drag Jalayirtai into an ambush, and this testifies to their mobility, not to their "heavy" qualities.

Martinez claimed that the "heavier" quality of the Ilkhanid army caused Abaqa to choose as the battlefield "an agricultural area where irrigation channels restricted cavalry movements."¹⁶³ In fact, Harawī states (immediately after the lines cited by Martinez) that due to the multiple quantities of buildings and irrigation canals the "agricultural" area was found unsuitable by the Ilkhanid commanders, who therefore elected an open plain as the battlefield,¹⁶⁴ a fact which is clearly confirmed by Rashīd al-Dīn.¹⁶⁵ Apparently what is most striking about this battle of Herat, when compared to battles fought in the region in the pre-Mongol period—mainly among the Khwārazmians and the Ghūrīds—or even to later Mongol clashes in the region, is the complete absence of siege warfare and hydraulic warfare (i.e. flooding the river in the face of the enemy).¹⁶⁶ This is not only because the issue at stake in 1270 was not the control of Herat but of Khurāsān, but also because none of the Mongol troops seemed to have mastered those techniques, and they therefore preferred to fight outside the city.

If not exclusively because of his army's better weaponry, why did Abaqa win? This was due to a combination of several factors, which I shall examine here.

Size: I certainly agree with Martinez that both forces struck contemporary observers as unusually large, and they probably were.¹⁶⁷ At least the lowest estimates of Abaqa's troops—50,000¹⁶⁸ 70,000¹⁶⁹

¹⁶³ Martinez, "Il-Xanid Army," pp. 155–6.

¹⁶⁴ Harawī, *Herat*, pp. 319–20; Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, p. 225.

¹⁶⁵ Rashīd/Alizādah, pp. 123, 125; Rashīd/Thackston, pp. 528, 529; Boyle, "Dynastic and Political History," p. 360.

¹⁶⁶ See, e.g., Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil fī al-tārīkh* (Beirut, 1966), vol. 12, pp. 190, 393; Harawī, *Herat*, p. 406. Martinez, "Il-Xanid Army," p. 155, claimed that one unit of Abaqa's troops was equipped with arbalests, but I did not find any reference to that.

¹⁶⁷ Martinez, "Il-Xanid Army," p. 154; see, e.g., Harawī, *Herat*, pp. 309, 317, 325; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, pp. 293, 304. Most of those descriptions refer to Abaqa's troops.

¹⁶⁸ al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, p. 435; Harawī, *Herat*, p. 324.

¹⁶⁹ Harawī, *Herat*, p. 326, cited in Martinez, "Il-Xanid Army," p. 154.

or 100,000¹⁷⁰—correspond with contemporary assessments of the Ilkhanid troops sent against the Mamluks,¹⁷¹ and are therefore quite plausible. It is much harder to accept the numbers given for Baraq's troops: 90,000,¹⁷² 100,000¹⁷³ or even 150,000.¹⁷⁴ The Mamluk sources do not emphasize Baraq's numerical superiority, although they report 40,000 Chaghadaid dead.¹⁷⁵ According to the Kirmānīd chronicle, however, Baraq crossed the Oxus with 20,000 horsemen, while Abaqa's troops (even without the Kirmānīd auxiliaries) are estimated at 100,000.¹⁷⁶ One wonders how Baraq, ruling only in Transoxania, deserted by Qaidu's troops, and unsupported by any auxiliary troops,¹⁷⁷ could bring to the field more troops than Abaqa. Estimates of the whole Central Asian armies (i.e., not only of Transoxania) are usually much smaller in comparison to the estimates of the other Mongol khanates. Marco Polo, for example, attributed 100,000 horsemen to Qaidu's army (including the Chaghadaid troops) and 300,000 horsemen to the Ilkhanate.¹⁷⁸ One can also mention that except for Harawī's generous descriptions, the actual fighting forces mentioned in the sources do not exceed a few thousands.¹⁷⁹ Moreover, the desertion of Qipchaq and Chabat with their 4000 horsemen was taken as a great blow to the Chaghadaid troops.¹⁸⁰ The only group that might have fought side by side with Baraq was the Qara'unas, since Rashīd al-Dīn maintains that the man who eventually gave Baraq a horse after his fall was Sali, the Qara'unas.¹⁸¹ Yet it is hard to

¹⁷⁰ *Tārīkh-i shāhī*, p. 287.

¹⁷¹ Amitai-Preiss, *Ilkhanid and Mamluks*, pp. 228 (60,000); 189 (50,000); Amitai, "Whither the Ilkhanid army," pp. 234–5 (65,000; 70,000; 90,000; 100,000).

¹⁷² Harawī, *Herat*, p. 329.

¹⁷³ Waṣṣāf, *Tārīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 71; Harawī, *Herat*, pp. 313, 321, 329; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, p. 293.

¹⁷⁴ Harawī, *Herat*, p. 310.

¹⁷⁵ al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, p. 436; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vol. 8, p. 150; Mufaddal, *al-Nahj al-sadīd*, p. 525.

¹⁷⁶ *Tārīkh-i shāhī*, pp. 287–8.

¹⁷⁷ Shams al-Dīn Kart indeed went to Herat to enlist such troops, but he never came back. Rashīd/Alizādah, p. 120.

¹⁷⁸ Polo, *Marco Polo*, trans. Yule, vol. 2, pp. 457–8; Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 35.

¹⁷⁹ See, e.g., Mīrkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, p. 293; Rashīd/Alizādah, p. 115; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 524; al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, p. 435; Harawī, *Herat*, p. 329; cf. Harawī, *Herat*, pp. 310–11.

¹⁸⁰ Rashīd/Alizādah, pp. 131–2; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 532.

¹⁸¹ Rashīd/Alizādah, p. 131; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 532, though previously this Sali is defined as one of Baraq's bodyguards (*kejiktānān*), Rashīd/Alizādah, p. 129; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 531; Harawī, *Herat*, p. 330 also described him only as a

assert how many of the Qara'unas, if any, indeed came to fight for Baraq, and since they were not punished by Abaqa after the battle (unlike others among Baraq's collaborators, such as Shams al-Dīn Kart) their presence in Baraq's ranks was probably not massive.¹⁸² The Ilkhanid troops, on the other hand, included most of Abaqa's senior commanders, whose troops arrived not only from Khurāsān but also from Azerbaijan, Darband and Anatolia and were reinforced by the auxiliary troops of Kirmān, Yazd and Georgia.¹⁸³ It is hard to determine the weight of these auxiliary troops, but Martinez certainly overemphasizes the role of the Georgian contingent, which the Ilkhanid sources do not even mention.¹⁸⁴ One should bear in mind that enlarging the numbers of the defeated enemy could be a device used by Ilkhanid chroniclers to magnify Abaqa's victory, and that we have no pro-Chaghadaid sources to balance this tendency. On the basis of our sources it is hard to claim unequivocally that Baraq's forces were numerically inferior, but this seems to have been likely.

Horses: Rashīd as-Dīn stresses the unreadiness of Baraq's horses as a main reason for his defeat.¹⁸⁵ Baraq's continuous complaints about his shortage of pasture lands, his confiscations of horses in Transoxania and Herat, his feeding the horses with grain at the expenses of the city dwellers, and his ordering his troops in Khurasan to ride donkeys and asses till the horses got fat,¹⁸⁶ all suggest that he had some difficulties with his supply and preparation of horses, though he certainly attempted to overcome it.

Mongol, one of Baraq's intimates. See also Aubin, "Qara'unas," 82 (based on Harawī, *Herat*, pp. 311-12, but not very convincing).

¹⁸² Cf. Shimo, "Qaraunas," 140, where he claimed that most of the Qaraunas fought with Abaqa.

¹⁸³ Rashīd/Alizadah, p. 127; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 530; Mirkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, pp. 305, 306, 317; *The Georgian Chronicle*, pp. 580-81. Rashīd mentioned 10 commanders of Abaqa, while the Georgian chronicle mentions 8; Harawī, *Herat*, p. 326 mentions 6; Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 73 mentions 7 princes, 3 commanders and 6 "commanders of Argun Aqa"; the Mamluk sources mention 5 commanders (Al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, p. 435; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vol. 8, p. 150).

¹⁸⁴ Martinez, "Il-Xanid Army," p. 156; see Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, p. 225.

¹⁸⁵ Rashīd/Alizadah, pp. 122, 127; Rashīd/Thackston, pp. 377, 527, 530; Harawī, *Herat*, p. 326.

¹⁸⁶ Mirkhwānd, *Rawdat*, vol. 5, p. 298; Rashīd/Alizadah, p. 118; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 526.

Two references suggest that Abaqa's troops also used "local" Arabian horses, stronger than the regular Mongol ponies. Before the battle Baraq impudently asked Abaqa for *tafchaq* horses, a term usually referring to Arabian or Turkmenian horses;¹⁸⁷ and when *Sechektu defected to Qipchaq, he brought a present of fine Arabian horses, which became a bone of contention between Qipchaq and Jalayirtai.¹⁸⁸ It is however impossible to determine how widespread was the use of such horses among Abaqa's troops or how significant it was. My impression is that it was more a matter of prestige than a true military asset.

Intelligence and knowledge of the terrain: Throughout the battle the two sides ascribed great importance to acquiring information on the enemy and on the terrain, through spies, scouts or diplomatic messengers, while at the same time trying to keep this information from reaching the enemy through subterfuge and disinformation. Abaqa had a certain advantage in this respect, not only because he caught the three spies (if he did), but mostly because his troops knew the terrain much better than the Chaghadaids. This enabled them to choose the battlefield and to block the Chaghadaid access to water.¹⁸⁹

Leadership and discipline: The importance of personal leadership is stressed throughout the descriptions of the battle: Abaqa's presence or absence was a major question for the Chaghadaids, and he himself was their chief target during the battle. Both Abaqa and Baraq took the field themselves rather late, when they were either winning (in Abaqa's case) or desperate (in the case of Baraq). Many reports stress the boldness of certain commanders on both sides: Abatai and Tūbshin on the Ilkhanid side, Margha'ul and Jalayirtai on that of the Chaghadaids.¹⁹⁰ Indeed, the killing of Margha'ul greatly harmed the Chaghadaids both practically and in terms of morale, and Baraq described it as a major reason for his defeat.¹⁹¹ Moreover, Abaqa's commanders seemed to have had firmer control over their troops: Yoshmut managed to redeploy his troops after the Chaghadaids

¹⁸⁷ Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jāmi' al-tawārikh*, ed. B. Karīmī (Tehran, 1959), vol. 1, p. 49; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 33; Doerfer, *Neupersischen*, vol. 2, p. 601.

¹⁸⁸ See n. 66 above.

¹⁸⁹ Rashīd/Alizadah, p. 127; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 530.

¹⁹⁰ See, e.g., al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, p. 435; *The Georgian Chronicle*, pp. 581-2; Rashīd/Alizadah, pp. 129-30; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 531.

¹⁹¹ Rashīd/Alizadah, pp. 133-5.

harmed the Ilkhanid flank, while Jalayirtai was unable to rearrange his dissolving troops in a similar situation. The desertion of Qaidu's troops, of which Abaqa was informed in good time, also contributed to his victory, and in turn undermined Baraq's leadership.¹⁹²

The Ilkhanids won the battle not because they employed heavy cavalry, but because their troops were light, mobile cavalry, just like the Chaghadaids. Yet they had a somewhat better supply of horses and weaponry, had better knowledge of the terrain of the battle and were better organized under a more capable leadership. In fact, it was exactly the Ilkhanid mobility that allowed the westernmost side to defeat its eastern rival, in contrast to former battles in the regions, such as the battle of Dandānqān (1040), the battle of Qatwān (1141), or the battle of Andkhūd (1204), in which the more mobile, eastern party won.¹⁹³

How was the battle of Herat different from Mongol battles fought against non-Mongol troops? In terms of tactics and armament, the battle of Herat had a lot in common with former Mongol encounters with non-Mongol rivals.¹⁹⁴ The main difference, however, is that in the battle of Herat both sides used the same "Mongol" methods. They were therefore more or less evenly matched, and the fight was difficult for both of them.

Moreover, unlike most of the former Mongol battles, this battle did not end in conquest. Not only did Baraq not conquer Khurāsān, but Abaqa also evacuated Bukhara soon after his invasion, retreating back to the western side of the Oxus. The battle of Herat, like the battles between the Ilkhanate and the Golden Horde, was a battle fought in order to determine the borders of the separate Mongol khanates that gradually emerged after Qubilai's accession. The enormous size of the empire at the end of Möngke's reign, Qubilai's weakness due to his struggle with his brother, and his transferring the Mongol capital to north China—all these developments contributed to a situation in which the major Chinggisid lineages were trying to assert their local authority. This was done at the expense

¹⁹² E.g., Rashīd/Alīzādah, pp. 134–5.

¹⁹³ For Dandānqān see David O. Morgan, *Medieval Persia* (London, 1998), pp. 22, 26; for Qatwān and Andkhūd see Biran, "China, Nomads and Islam," Chs. 1, 3, 5.

¹⁹⁴ For general assessments of the Mongol armies see Martin, "The Mongol Army," *passim*; Morgan, *The Mongols*, pp. 89–95.

of the rights of the Qa'an in the sedentary territories, and of the rights of absentee princes in different places.¹⁹⁵

Another tendency, already present in Möngke's time but reinforced when the dissolution of the empire hampered the Mongols' ability to recruit and mobilize troops throughout the empire, was the increase in the importance of the sedentary territories. Baraq and Qaidu fought mainly over Bukhara and Samarkand and their workshops and troops, and Abaqa chose to reduce Bukhara to ashes. In this respect Baraq, who declared he would take over Iraq and Azerbaijan, and was therefore willing to plunder Transoxania and Khurāsān, perhaps showed some remnant of the old Mongol spirit. His contemporaries understood that the name of the game was now the consolidation of rule in the existing territories, rather than conquering new ones.¹⁹⁶

In contrast with their battles against non-Mongol troops, when fighting against each other the Mongols could not use their imperial ideology to legitimize their actions, and the general theme of the Chinggisid lineage was not sufficient to secure Mongol loyalty. In shaping the new borders of the khanates, the Mongols tried to find allies along lineage lines (as in the cases of Tegüder and *Sechektu). Yet *realpolitik*, which temporarily connected, for example, Qaidu and Abaqa, was no less useful as a basis for alliance.

The battle of Herat was thus an important stage in defining the borders of the independent khanates. The Central Asian Mongols, however, remained a thorn in the side of the other Mongol khanates. This is not only because they lost the battle, but because two imperial lineages, the Chaghadaids and the Ögödeids, were stuck together there, and their struggles stirred trouble even beyond their own territories.¹⁹⁷ Moreover, the relatively poor territory of Central Asia was squeezed between the other Mongol khanates, with no convenient scope for expansion other than at the expense of the neighboring khanates. Even as a way of keeping their troops busy, the Central Asian Mongols were likely to harass the other khanates. Yet they

¹⁹⁵ See Jackson, "From Ulus to Khanate," *passim*; Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 27; Rashīd/Alīzādah, p. 114; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 523.


¹⁹⁶ Rashīd al-Dīn stresses the apparent difference between Baraq's "oppressive" rule and Abaqa's benevolence. One should bear in mind however that in his dealing with Bukhara Abaqa was not less furious than Baraq was in Khurāsān.

¹⁹⁷ See, e.g., the struggles in Central Asia between 1270–82 and after Qaidu's death in the first two decades of the 13th century.

were unlikely to challenge them in large battles. The Central Asian Mongols, at least between Baraq and Temür Lang, probably realized they were unable to eliminate any of the other Mongol states. Nor were they necessarily interested in doing so. The rhetoric of the Chinggisid unity, so prevalent in the descriptions of the battle of Herat,¹⁹⁸ did not prevent the different Chinggisid lineages from fighting each other, but it proved that they all acknowledged the rights of the other Chinggisids to rule over parts of the empire. Besides, the other Mongol khanates did not prove easy rivals, as the Chaghadaids found out at Herat. It is therefore not surprising that the Central Asian Mongols chose raids, not battles, as their main form of future warfare,¹⁹⁹ thereby leaving the battle of Herat as a rather unique example of inter-Mongol warfare on the grand scale.

¹⁹⁸ See, e.g., Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, pp. 69, 74; Rashīd/'Alizādah, pp. 109–10; Mīrklhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, pp. 286–8; Harawī, *Herat*, p. 305.

¹⁹⁹ See, e.g., Biran, *Qaidu*, pp. 81–92.



Map 2: Greater Iran in the 13th Century
(After Biran, *Qaidu* [Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 1997], 117).




Figure 1: The Main Chinggisid Branches and the Great Khans
(After Biran, *Qaidu* [Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 1997], 120).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abc Takeo 安部健夫. *Xi Huigu guoshi de yanjiu* 回鹘國史の研究. Urumqi: Xinjiang chubanshe 新疆出版社, 1986.
- Allen, W.E.D. *A History of the Georgian People*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1932.
- Allsen, Thomas, T. "Changing Forms of Legitimation in Mongol Iran." *Rulers from the Steppe*. Ed. Gary Seaman and Daniel Marks. Los Angeles: Ethnographic Press, 1991, pp. 223-41.
- . "Mahmud Yalavach." *In the Service of the Khan. Eminent Personalities of the Early Mongol-Yuan Period*. Ed. I. deRachewiltz et al. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassovitz, 1993, pp. 122-36.
- . *Mongol Imperialism: The Policies of the Grand Qan Möngke in China, Russia and the Islamic Lands 1251-1259*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987.
- . "The Rise of the Mongolian Empire and Mongolian rule in North China." *Alien Regimes and Border States 907-1368*. Ed. Denis Twitchett and Herbert Franke. Vol. 6 of *The Cambridge History of China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1994, pp. 321-413.
- . "The Yuan Dynasty and the Uighurs in Turfan in the 13th Century." *China among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and its Neighbors, 10th-14th Centuries*. Ed. Morris Rossabi. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California press, 1983, pp. 243-80.
- Amitai-Preiss, Reuven. *Mongols and Mamluks: The Mamluk-Ilkhānid War, 1260-1281*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
- Anonymous. *Ta'rikh-i shāhī-i Qarā Khitā'iyān*. Ed. M.I. Bāstānī Pārīzī. Manābi' ta'rikh wa-jughrāfiyā-i Irān, vol. 75. Tehran: Fardīn, 1966-7.
- Aubin, Jean. "L'ethnogenese des Qara'unas." *Turcica*, 1 (1969), pp. 65-94.
- Ayalon, David. *Eunuchs, Caliphs and Sultans: A Study in Power Relations*. Jerusalem: Magness, 1999.
- Āyātī, 'Abd Āl Muḥammad. *Tahrīr-i ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*. Manābi' ta'rikh wa-jughrāfiyā-i Irān, vol. 4. Tehran: Chāpkhānah-i 'ilmī, 1967.
- al-'Aynī, Badr al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. 'Alī. *Iqd al-jumān fī ta'rikh ahl al-zamān*. MS. Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmet III 2912.
- 'Azīm Ābādī. *Awn al-ma'būd fī shakh Abū Da'ud*. 13 vols. Medina: al-Maktaba al-salafiyya, 1968.
- Bar Hebraeus. *The Chronography of Gregory Abu'l Faraj. commonly known as Bar Hebraeus*. Trans. Ernest A. Wallis Budge. Vol. 1. London: Oxford University Press, 1932.
- Barthold, Wilhelm. *An Historical Geography of Iran*. Trans. Svat Soucek, ed. Clifford E. Bosworth. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- . *Four Studies on the History of Central Asia*. Trans. V. Minorsky and T. Minorsky. 3 vols. Leiden: Brill, 1956-62.
- . *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion*. Trans. T. Minorsky. 4th edition. E.J.W. Gibb Memorial Series, n.s., no. 5. London: Luzac, 1977.
- Baybars al-Manṣūrī al-Dawādār, Rukn al-Dīn. *Zubdat al-fikra fī ta'rikh al-hijra*. MS British Library Add. 23325.

- . *Zubdat al-fikra fī ta'rikh al-hijra*. Ed. D.S. Richards. Berlin: al-Kitāb al-'arabī, 1998.
- Biran, Michal. *Qaidu and the Rise of the Independent Mongol State in Central Asia*. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 1997.
- . "China, Nomads and Islam: The Qara Khitai (Western Liao) Dynasty 1124–1218." Dissertation. The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2000.
- Boyle, John Andrew. "Dynastic and Political History of the Ilkhans." In *The Saljuq and Mongol Periods*. Ed. John Andrew Boyle. Vol. 5 of *The Cambridge History of Iran*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968, pp. 303–421.
- . "The Ilkhans of Persia and the Princes of Europe." *Central Asiatic Journal*, 20, no. 1 (1976), pp. 25–40.
- Bretschneider, Emili V. *Medieval Researches from Eastern Asiatic Sources*. 2 vols. London, 1888.
- Brosset, M., trans. *Histoire de la Georgie*. Part 1. St. Petersburg, 1850.
- Browne, Edward G. *A Literary History of Persia*. 4 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951–53.
- al-Dhahabī, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Aḥmad. *Ta'rikh al-islām*. Ed. U.A. Tadmūrī. Vol. 67. Beirut: Dār al-kitāb al-'arabī, 1999.
- Doerfer, Gerhard. *Türkische und mongolische Elemente im Neupersischen*. 4 vols. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1963–74.
- D'Ohsson, A.C.M. *Histoire des Mongols*. 4 vols. The Hague, 1834; photographic rpt. Tientsin, 1940.
- Fletcher, Joseph F. "The Mongols: Ecological and Social Perspectives." *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 46, no. 1 (June, 1986), pp. 11–50.
- Grigor of Akanc' (should be Akner). "History of the Nation of the Archers." Eds. And trans. Robert P. Blake and Richard N. Frye, *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 12, no. 2 (December, 1949), pp. 269–399.
- Guo, Li. *Early Mamluk Syrian Historiography: al-Yūnīnī's Dhayl Mir'āt al-zamān*. 2 vols. Leiden: Brill, 1998.
- Harawī, Sayf b. Muḥammad b. Ya'qūb. *Ta'rikh nāmah-i Harāt*. Ed. M.Z. al-Ṣiddīqī. Calcuta: The Baptist Mission Press and the Imperial Library, 1944.
- Howorth, Henry H. *The History of the Mongols from the 9th to the 19th Century*. 4 vols. London, 1876–1927; rpt. New York: B. Franklin, 1965.
- Ibn al-Athīr, 'Izz al-Dīn 'Alī. *al-Kāmil fī al-ta'rikh*. 13 vols. Beirut: Dār ṣādir, 1966.
- Ibn Baṭṭūṭa. *Voyages d'Ibn Baṭṭūṭa*. Ed. and trans. C. Defremery and B.R. Sanguinetti. 4 vols. Paris: L'Imprimerie Nationale, 1969.
- . *The Travels of Ibn Battuta*. Trans. Hamilton A.R. Gibb. 4 vols. Cambridge: The Hakluyt society, 1958–1994.
- Ibn al-Dawādārī, Abū Bakr b. 'Abdallāh. *Kanz al-dīwar wa-jāmi 'al-ghuwar*. Vol. 8: *al-Durra al-kanziyya fī akhbār al-dawla al-turkiyya* (*Der Bericht über die frühen Mamluken*). Ed. U. Haarmann. Quellen zur Geschichte des islamischen Agypten, vol. 1h–li. Freiburg-Cairo: Maṭba'at 'isā al-bābī, 1971.

- Ibn al-Furāt, Nāṣir al-Dīn. *Ta'rikh al-duwal wa'l-mulūk*. Ed. Q. Zurayk. Vol. 7. Beirut: al-Maṭba'a al-amīrikāniyya, 1942.
- Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, Kamāl al-Dīn Abū 'l-Faḍl. *al-hawādith al-jāmi'a wa'l-tajārib al-nāfi'a fī al-mī'a al-sābi'a*. Ed. M. Jawād. Baghdad: al-Maṭba'a al-'arabiyya, 1932–3.
- Ibn Kathīr, Abū al-Fidā'. *al-Bidāya wa'l-nihāya fī'l-ta'rikh*. Vol. 13. Cairo: Maṭba'at al-sa'āda, 1939.
- Jackson, Peter. "Abaqa." *Encyclopedia Iranica*, vol. 1 (1985), pp. 61–3.
- . "Chahgatayid Dynasty." *Encyclopedia Iranica*, vol. 5 (1992), pp. 343–7.
- . "The Dissolution of the Mongol Empire." *Central Asiatic Journal*, 22, no. 2 (1978), pp. 186–244.
- . "Djamāl Ḳarshī," *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2nd edition, Supp. 3–4 (1981), p. 240.
- . "From Ulus to Khanate: The Making of the Mongol States c. 1220–1290." *The Mongol Empire and its Legacy*. Ed. Reuven Amitai-Preiss and David O. Morgan. Leiden: Brill, 1999, pp. 12–37.
- Juwaynī, 'Alā' al-Dīn 'Aṭā'-malik. *Ta'rikh-i jahān gushā*. Ed. M.M. Qazwīnī. E.J.W. Gibb Memorial Series, vol. 16. 3 vols. London and Leiden: Luzac and Brill, 1912–37.
- . *The History of World Conqueror*. Trans. John A. Boyle. 2 vols. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958.
- Khaṭṭābī, Abū Sulaymān, Ḥamd b. Muḥammad. *Ma'ālim al-sunan*. Ed. M. Ghārib al-Ṭabbāḥ. 4 vols. Aleppo: al-Maṭba'a al-'ilmiyya, 1933.
- Kirmānī, Nāṣir al-Dīn Munshī. *Simt al-ulā li'l-ḥadra al-'ulyā*. Ed. I. 'Abbās. Tehran: Majala-i yādgār, 1949.
- Krawulsky, Dorothea. *Iran—Das Reich der Ilhane*. Wiesbaden: L. Reichert, 1978.
- Little, Donald. P. *An Introduction to Mamluk Historiography*. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1970.
- Liu Yingsheng 劉迎勝. "Lun Talasi huiyi 論塔剌思會議." *Yuanshi luncong*, 元史論叢, 4 (1992), pp. 256–65.
- . 劉迎勝. "Ali Buge zhi luan yu Chahatai hanguo de fazhan 阿里不哥之亂與察哈台汗國的發展." *Xinjiang daxue xuebao* 新疆大學學報, 1987, pp. 29–37.
- Lockhart, L. "The Relations between Edward I and Edward II of England and the Mongol Ilkhans of Persia." *Iran*, 6 (1968), pp. 22–31.
- Marco Polo. *The Book of Sir Marco Polo*. Trans. and ed. Henry Yule, rev. Henry Cordier. 2 vols. London: Murray, 1903.
- . *The Description of the World*. Trans. and eds. Arthur C. Moule and Paul Pelliot. 2 vols. London: Routledge and Sons, 1935–1938.
- Martin, Henry. D. "The Mongol Army." *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, no. 1 (1943), pp. 46–85.
- Martinez, A.P. "Some Notes on the Il-Xanid Army." *Archivum Eurasiac Medii Aevi*, 6 (1988), pp. 129–242.
- Mürkhwānd, Muḥammad b. Khwāndshāh. *Ta'rikh-i rawdat al-safā*. 13 vols. Tehran: Payrūz, 1961.
- Morgan, David O. *Medieval Persia*. London: Longman, 1983.
- . *The Mongols*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986.

- . "Rashīd al-Dīn Ṭabīb." *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2nd edition, vol. 8 (1995), pp. 458–59.
- Mufaḍḍal Ibn Abī al-Faḍā'il. *al-Nahj al-saḍīd wa'l-durr al-farīd fīmā ba'da Ibn al-Amīd* (*Histoire des sultans mamlouks*). Ed. and trans. E. Blochet. *Patrologia orientalis*, vols. 12, 14, 20. Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1919–28.
- Mu'in, Muḥammad. *Farhang-i fārisī*. 6 vols. Tehran: Honar, 1963.
- al-Nuwayrī, Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb. *Nihāyat al-arab fī funūn al-adab*. Vol. 27. Ed. F. 'Ashūr. Cairo: al-Hay'a al-miṣriyya al-'amma li'l-kitāb, 1984.
- Petrushevsky, I.P. "The Socio-Economic Condition of Iran under the Mongols." In *The Saljuq and Mongol Periods*. Ed. John A. Boyle. Vol. 5 of *The Cambridge History of Iran*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968, pp. 483–537.
- Qarshī, Jamāl. *Mulkhaqāt al-surāh*. In Bartold, V.V. *Turkestan v epokhu 'mongol'skogo nashestia*. St. Petersburg, 1900. Vol. I (texts), pp. 128–52.
- Qazwīnī, Ḥamdallāh b. Abī Bakr Mustawfī. *Ta'rikh-i guzīda*. Ed. E.G. Browne. E.J.W. Gibb Memorial Series, vol. 14. London and Leiden: Luzac and Brill, 1910.
- Rashīd al-Dīn. *Jāmi' al-tawārikh*. Ed. A.A. 'Alizādāh. Vol. 3. Baku: Nashariyyāt-i farhangistān-i 'ulūm-i jumhūrī-i sosiyālīstī-i Ādhirbāyjan, 1957.
- . *Jāmi' al-tawārikh* Vol. 2. Ed. E. Blochet. E.J.W. Gibb Memorial Series, vol. 18. London and Leiden: Luzac and Leiden, 1911.
- . *Jāmi' al-tawārikh*. Ed. B. Karīmī. 2 vols. Tehran: Iqbāl, 1959.
- . *Jami'u't-tawarikh [sic] Compendium of Chronicles*. Trans. Wheeler M. Thackston. Central Asian Sources IV. 3 vols. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University, Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, 1998–9.
- . *The Successors of Genghis Khan*. Trans. John A. Boyle. New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1971.
- Reid, Robert W. "Mongolian Weaponry in *The Secret History of the Mongols*." *Mongolian Studies*, 15 (1992), pp. 85–96.
- Rossabi, Morris. *Khubilai Khan*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988.
- Shimo, Hirotoishi. "The Qara'unas in the Historical Materials of the Ilkhanate." *Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko*, 35 (1977), pp. 131–81.
- Smith, J.M. "Ayn Jālūt: Mamluk Success or Mongol Failure?" *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 44, no. 2 (December, 1984), pp. 307–45.
- . "Mongol Society and Military in the Middle East: Antecedents and Adaptations." *War and Society in the Eastern Mediterranean, 7th–15th Centuries*. Ed. Y. Lev. Leiden: Brill, 1997, pp. 249–66.
- Song Lian 宋濂. *Yuan shi* 元史. 15 vols. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1976.
- Spuler, Bertold. "Āl-e Kart," *Encyclopedia Iranica*, vol. 1 (1985), pp. 758–60.
- . *Die goldene Horde: Die Mongolen in Russland 1223–1502*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1965.
- . *Die Mongolen in Iran: Politik, Verwaltung und Kultur der Ilchanzeit 1220–1350*. 4th edition. Leiden: Brill, 1985.

- Steingass, F. *Persian-English Dictionary*. 8th edition. London and New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1988.
- al-Ṭabarī, Muḥammad b. Jarīr. *Ta'rikh al-rusul wa'l-muluk*. Ed. M.J. De Goege. 15 vols. in 3 series. Leiden, 1879–1901.
- . *The History of Ṭabarī*. Vol. 8, *The Victory of Islam*. Trans. M. Fishbein. New York: State University of New York press, 1997; Vol. 31, *The War between Brothers*. Trans. M. Fishbein. New York: State University of New York press, 1992.
- Vernadsky, George. *The Mongols and Russia*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953.
- al-'Umarī, Aḥmad b. Yahya ibn Faḍlallāh. *Das Mongolische Weltreich: al-'Umarī's Darstellung der mongolischen Reiche in seinem Werk Masālik al-abṣār fī mamālik al-amṣār*. Ed. and trans. K. Lech. Asiatische Forschungen, vol. 14. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1968.
- Waṣṣāf, 'Abdallāh b. Faḍlallāh. *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf* (*Tajziyat al-amṣār wa-tazjiyat al-aṣṣār*). Litograph edition. Bombay, 1952–3; rpt. Tehran, 1959–60. [See also Ayāṭī above].
- William of Rubruck. *The Mission of Friar William of Rubruck*. Trans. and ed. Peter Jackson. Ed. David O. Morgan. London: The Hakluyt Society, 1990.
- al-Yūnīnī, Quṭb al-Dīn Mūsā b. Muḥammad. *Dhayl mirā't al-zamān fī ta'rikh al-ā'yān*. 4 vols. Hyderabad: Maṭba'at majlis al-ma'ārif al-'uthmāniyya, 1954–61.
- Zhou Liangxiao 周良霄 *Hubilie* 忽必列. Changchun: Jilin jiaoyu chubanshe 吉林教育出版社, 1986.