

## VIOLENCE AND NON-VIOLENCE IN THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF BAGHDAD (1258)

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The Mongol conquest of Baghdad in 656/1258 has often been described as a medieval holocaust, an extremely violent act, which led not only to the collapse of the 'Abbāsid caliphate (750–1258) and the city of Baghdad, but to the decline of Islamic civilisation as a whole. Clichés such as: 'If the Mongols had not burnt the libraries of Baghdad in the 13th century, we Arabs would have had so much science, that we would long since have invented the atomic bomb'<sup>1</sup> can still be heard in the Arab world. Moreover, this anachronistic view has been revived in the last decade when the Mongol conquest of Baghdad became a favourable metaphor for the American occupation of 2003. Descriptions of the fall of Baghdad as an act of infidels' vandalism directed against Islamic or Iraqi civilisation or as a burst of violence that took centuries to overcome prevail in contemporary Arabic literature and in Muslim Internet sites, as well as in some of the Western general surveys that seek to explain Iraq from Chinggis Khan to Saddam Hussein and after.<sup>2</sup>

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1. Cited from 'a high Syrian official' in the late 1950s in B. Lewis, 'The Mongols, the Turks and Muslim Polity', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th series, 18 (1968), p. 49.
2. E.g., R. al-Sargānī, *Qiṣṣat al-Tatār* (Cairo, 2006); Aḥmad Manṣūr, *Qiṣṣat suqūṭ Bāghdād*

This chapter aims to look afresh at the question of violence in the conquest of Baghdad. While not denying that the conquest was a violent occupation, it highlights the non-violent means that were involved in it, and the ways in which such violence was understood and legitimised by the contemporaneous Muslim writers. On the basis of biographical literature from both the Īl-Khānate and the Mamlūk sultanate, it argues that the violence was not addressed towards the Islamic civilisation as a whole, and that the non-violent means and Baghdad's swift and overall successful restoration contributed significantly to the legitimisation and marginalisation of the violence involved in the conquest in the collective memory of the Eastern Islamic world until the rise of nationalism.<sup>3</sup> As a starting point I would like to refer to a unique and highly personal eye-witness account of the conquest, which is quite different from its conventional descriptions.

The evidence in question is that of 'Abd al-Mu'min b. Yūsuf b. Fākhir Šafi al-Dīn Urmawī, one of the more illustrious musical artists and theoreticians in the Muslim world. Born in Urūmiya (a city in modern-day Iran), he arrived in Baghdad as a young boy. Urmawī launched a career as a Šāfi'ite lawyer at the newly established Mustansiriyya College, but in addition to his expertise in Šāfi'ite and comparative law, he was also well-versed in calligraphy, Arabic language, poetry, history, mathematics and, of course, music. By the age of twenty-one he had already completed his *magnum opus*, *Kitāb al-adwār* (The book of cycles), a systematic exposition on the modal system, which became one of the most influential works on Islamic music theory. In addition, he was also an accomplished singer and lute player. Urmawī was first employed at the court of the last 'Abbāsīd Caliph, al-Musta'šim bi-Allāh (r. 640–56/1242–58) as a calligrapher, responsible for the Caliph's library. With the recommendation of one of his students, the Caliph's favourite songstress Luḥāz, his musical talents were brought to the Caliph's attention and he was appointed as a court musician, earning a generous salary, becoming a close companion of the Caliph and his ministers and tutoring the Caliph's son.<sup>4</sup>

(Beirut, 2003); W. R. Polk, *Understanding Iraq: The Whole Sweep of Iraqi History, from Genghis Khan's Mongols to the Ottoman Turks to the British Mandate to the American Occupation* (New York, 2005).

3. For the impact of nationalism on the Mongols' image in the Muslim world see M. Biran, *Chinggis Khan* (Oxford, 2007), pp. 127–36.
4. On Urmawī, see M. Biran, 'Music in the Conquest of Baghdad: Safi al-Din Urmawi and the Ilkhanid Circle of Musicians', in *The Mongols and the Transformation of the Middle East*, eds B. De Nicola and Ch. Melville (Leiden, 2016), pp. 133–54; see also, e.g., E. Neubauer, 'Šafi al-Dīn Urmawī', in *EI2*; al-Kutubī, *Fawāt al-wafayāt* (Beirut, 2000), 2, pp. 31–2; al-Šafadī, *al-Wāfi bil-wafayāt* (Beirut, 1987–91), 19, pp. 342–3; al-'Umarī, *Masālik al-abšār wa-mamālik al-amšār* (Beirut, 2010), 10, pp. 350–1; Ibn al-Ṭiqtaqā,

Urmawī's experience during the Mongol conquest of Baghdad is recorded in the volume on musicians of the encyclopaedia *Masālik al-abšār fī mamālik al-amšār* (Paths of Discernment into the Kingdoms of the Lands), which was compiled by the Mamlūk historian, administrator and encyclopaedist Shihāb al-Dīn al-'Umarī (d. 749/1349), one of the most knowledgeable Mamlūk historians about the Mongols.<sup>5</sup> His account is based on the testimony of al-'Izz al-Irbilī, alias al-Ḥasan b. Aḥmad b. Zafar (d. 726/1326), a physician and historian who migrated to Damascus from the Īl-Khānate during or after Ghazan's reign, and is famous for his unique biographical information.<sup>6</sup>

The story is worthy of being quoted in full, but as this has been done elsewhere,<sup>7</sup> I will only give a summary of it below.

According to Urmawī, during the conquest Hülegü summoned the city's leaders and asked them to divide Baghdad's quarters and the residences of its people of means among his commanders. He then allotted the various

*al-Fakhrī fī al-ādāb al-sulṭāniyya wa-l-duwal al-islāmiyya* (Paris, 1895), pp. 74, 449–50. Available (with missing pages) at: <https://archive.org/details/alfakhrhistoire00deregoog> (accessed 20 January 2016); and Ibn al-Ṭiqtaqā, *Al Fakhrī*, trans. Charles E. J. Whitting (London, 1947), pp. 49, 317. On his stature in the field of Islamic music, see, e.g., A. Shiloah, *Music in the World of Islam: A Socio-Cultural Study* (Detroit, 1995), pp. 55–8, 111–23; O. Wright, 'A Preliminary Version of the *kitāb al-Adwār*', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 58.3 (1995), 455–78.

5. On al-'Umarī, see K. S. Salibi, 'Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-'Umarī', in *EI2*; and Lech's introduction in Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-'Umarī, *Das Mongolische Weltreich: al-'Umarī's Darstellung der mongolischen Reiche in seinem Werk Masālik al-abšār fī mamālik al-amšār* = vol. 3 of *Masālik al-abšār*, ed. and trans. K. Lech (Wiesbaden, 1968), esp. pp. 13–16.
6. On al-'Izz al-Irbilī, see al-Šafadī, *A 'yān al-'aṣr wa-a'wān al-naṣr* (Beirut and Damascus, 1998), 2, pp. 188–9; al-Šafadī, *al-Wāfi*, 12, p. 239; Ibn Ḥajar, *al-Durar al-kāmina* (Cairo, 1966), 2, p. 92; and Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya wa-l-nihāya* (Beirut, 1993), 14, p. 144. For al-Irbilī as a source for information about the Īl-Khāns, see al-Šafadī, *A 'yān*, 4, pp. 9, 14, 43; and al-'Umarī, *Masālik*, 10, p. 193.
7. For the complete translated text, see Biran, 'Music', pp. 135–9; also G. J. H. van Gelder, 'Sing Me to Sleep: Safi al-Din al-Urmawi, Hulegu, and the Power of Music', *Quaderni di Studi Arabi* n. s. 7 (2012), 1–9. The text appears in al-'Umarī, *Masālik*, 10, pp. 353–6; or the facsimile edition by F. Sezgin with A. Jolhosha, E. Neubauer: al-'Umarī, *Masālik al-abšār fī mamālik al-amšār*, 30 vols in 27, eds F. Sezgin with A. Jolhosha and E. Neubauer (Frankfurt am Main, 1988–2001). Al-'Umarī's text is quoted, with minor changes, in Ibn Ḥijja al-Hamawī (d. 837/1434), *Thamarāt al-awraq* (Cairo, 1971), pp. 461–6. The story is cited in 'A. 'Azzāwī, *al-Mūsīqā al-'Irāqīyyah fī 'ahd al-Mughūl wa-l-Turkmān* (Baghdad, 1951), pp. 27–31; and N. Ma'rūf, *Tārīkh 'ulamā' al-Mustansiriyya* (Cairo, 1976), 1, pp. 270–4. A slightly confused Hebrew summary, based on 'Azzāwī's work, is included in A. S. Abu Rukun, 'The fall of Abbasid Baghdad (658H/1258) as reflected in Arabic historiography and the Arab literature' (unpublished PhD thesis, Bar-Ilan University, Israel, 2010), pp. 117–20.

neighbourhoods to his commanders, giving them permission to kill, capture, and loot for one to three days according to their ranks. Urmawī's quarter was allotted to a commander of 10,000 riders, named Bānū (probably Baiju) Noyan,<sup>8</sup> who was granted a three days' 'looting span'. The commander arrived at the quarter with his troops, and stopped at its gate, which was barricaded with wood and earth. He knocked on the gate, shouting: 'Open the gate and obey us, and we will give you safe conduct (*amān*). And if not, we will burn the gate and kill you.'

Urmawī went out, terrified for his life. He identified himself as the neighbourhood's leader and said he would bring whatever the commander asked for in order to save the quarter. He invited the commander to stay at his house while his troops plunder the other neighbourhoods, and hosted the commander and his retinue in great pomp, sitting them on silken carpets embroidered with gold, serving them delicious food and wine in gilded vessels, and arranging the neighbourhood's women singers to give a special concert for the conquerors. The Mongol commander, animated by the music, hugged a songstress he liked, and had intercourse with her (*wāqa'ahā*) during the assembly, while the crowd was watching. According to Urmawī, 'His day came to a close in the best possible way.'

By the evening, the commander's troops arrived with loot and prisoners from the other neighbourhoods. Before they left, Urmawī brought them presents of gold and silver dishes, coins, cash and splendid cloths. Apologising for the dearth of gifts, however, he promised the Mongol commander that he would get better treatment tomorrow. After Baiju was gone, Urmawī gathered the quarter's people of means, explained that they still had to host the Mongol noble for two more days and that they should double the presents each day. The Baghdadis collected all kinds of gold, precious cloths and arms worth 50,000 dinars, and when Baiju returned early the next day he was amazed by the assembled wealth. On the third day, again after presenting Baiju with various precious offerings including the Caliph's jennet, Urmawī told him: 'This quarter is already under your command; and if you grant its people their lives, he

8. Noyan in Mongolian means noble. Baiju (often rendered Bājū in Arabic sources, fl. 625–57/1228–59) was the Mongol general and military governor in north-western Iran and Anatolia under the United Mongol Empire. When Hülegü advanced westward, Baiju was among the generals under his command. He distinguished himself in the Baghdad campaign, as his forces subdued the western part of the city, but was executed shortly afterwards. See P. Jackson, 'Bāyjū', in *Encyclopaedia Iranica*. Available at: [www.iranicaonline.org/articles/bayju-baiju-or-baicu-mongol-general-and-military-governor-in-northwestern-iran-fl](http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/bayju-baiju-or-baicu-mongol-general-and-military-governor-in-northwestern-iran-fl) (accessed 12 December 2015).

(i.e., Hülegü) will be blameless in the eyes of God and men, for all that is left to them is their souls.' Baiju answered: 'I know this. From the first day I gave them their souls, and my soul did not tell me to kill or capture them. But before doing anything else, you should come with me to see the Khan.' The terrified Urmawī, afraid for his life, tried to avoid the meeting, but Baiju promised him that he would be safe and added, 'Hülegü is a man who likes the men of talents (*ahl al-faḍā'il*).'

Once more Urmawī collected from his neighbours gold, silver and cash. From his own house, he brought the best food and wine in exquisite dishes, chose a few beautiful songstresses to accompany him and put on his best suit. When the commander saw him, he was impressed and Urmawī explained: 'Indeed, I am the caliph's singer and his companion, but so long as I feared you, I wore those tattered and filthy clothes. When I became [one of] your subjects, my status was restored and I felt secure. Hülegü is a great king, greater than the caliph, and I can only enter his presence with courtliness and dignity.'

The commander liked his answer. When they reached Hülegü's camp, Urmawī won his favour both by the magnificent presents he brought and by his musical skills: when Hülegü, after making sure that Urmawī indeed had been the Caliph's singer, asked him, 'What is the best thing you know in the science of music (*ilm al-ṭarab*)?' Urmawī answered that it was 'a song that I sing which causes the listener to fall asleep'. Upon Hülegü's request, Urmawī and his accompanying songstress sang a lullaby to the Khan, and made him fall asleep (with the help of a few cups of wine that the musician encouraged him to drink first). The impressed Hülegü allotted to Urmawī a generous annual stipend – twice the one that the Caliph bestowed upon him – and, in response to Urmawī's request, a garden (*bustān*) that belonged to the Caliph – noting that had the musician asked, he could have gotten a whole city or a fortress. The Khan ordered not to harm the musician's quarter, and sent him back with fifty riders, who guarded the neighbourhood until Hülegü left Baghdad.

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While it is difficult to verify the details in Urmawī's vivid account, its main contours seem plausible enough, as they echo ʿĪl-Khānid sources,<sup>9</sup> and many of the

9. A less heroic version of the story appears in the history of Waṣṣāf; according to him, as the Mongols were occupying Baghdad, Urmawī appeared on the threshold of Hülegü's tent and began playing music. Amid the chaos, he performed from morning to evening, but nobody paid any attention. When Hülegü was informed of the situation, he summoned the musician, praised his performance and took him under his aegis. Urmawī was granted

elements dovetail neatly with other contemporaneous descriptions of Baghdad's fall. As for Urmawī, after the conquest he received a lucrative job in Mongol administration in Iraq, remained in contact with Hülegü, and later became a protégé of the Juwaynīs.<sup>10</sup> He continued to teach and study music in Baghdad and was considered one of the most prominent scholars in the reign of Hülegü's son, Abaqa (r. 663–81/1265–82).<sup>11</sup>

For the question of the violence practiced in the conquest of Baghdad, its alternatives and legitimation, the story is instructive in several ways: first, even this story, that highlights the non-violent alternative offered to certain Baghdadi groups, attests for the high amount of violence involved in the conquest. The Mongols plundered various Baghdadi neighbourhoods and did not hesitate to rape a songstress at their host's house. Moreover, their reputation for violence was well known in the city, as attested by Urmawī's frequent references to his fear throughout his account.<sup>12</sup>

However, the sack of Baghdad as displayed in Urmawī's story was not an outburst of barbarism, but a meticulously organised campaign of systematic and controlled violence, the application or cessation of which was based on the strict discipline of the Mongol troops to Hülegü's orders.<sup>13</sup> Urmawī's accounts

an annual pension of 10,000 dinars (twice the amount of his caliphal stipend) from the government's revenues of Baghdad, a pension that was supposed to be conferred on his descendants as well. Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf = Tajziyat al-amṣār wa-tazjiyat al-a'sār* (Bombay, 1852–3 [1269]; repr. Tehran, 1959–60 [1338 *shamsī*]), pp. 42–3, 55; 'Abd al-Muḥammad Āyatī, *Tahrīr-i ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf* (Tehran, 1346 *shamsī*/1967), pp. 23, 33; for latter variants see Khwāndamīr, *Ta'rikh-i ḥabīb al-siyar* (Tehran, 1333 *shamsī*/1955), 3, p. 107; Wheeler M. Thackston, trans. *Ḥabīb al-siyar* (Cambridge, MA, 1994), 3, p. 60; Ḥājji Khalifa [Kātib Čelebi], *Kashf al-zunūn 'an asāmī al-kutub wa-l-funūn* (Istanbul, 1941–55), 1, p. 874; Biran, 'Music', p. 140.

10. The Juwaynī brothers held important administrative positions in the Īl-Khānate: 'Alā' al-Dīn 'Aṭā Malik (623–81/1226–83), the famous historian, was the Mongol governor of Baghdad, and is mentioned below; Shams al-Dīn (d. 682/1284), served as the chief financial minister (*ṣāhib dīwān*) of Hülegü and his successor, Abaqa. Both were also great patrons of scholars. See, e.g., G. Lane, *Early Mongol Rule in Thirteenth Century Iran: A Persian Renaissance* (London and New York, 2003), pp. 177–212.

11. Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 55; Āyatī, *Tahrīr-i ta'rikh*, p. 32; and see Biran, 'Music', pp. 140, 144–5.

12. Al-'Umarī, *Masālik*, 10, pp. 6–353; see also the quote from al-'Umarī/Lech, *Das Mongolische Weltreich*, p. 102 below.

13. This is apparent in other sources as well: see, e.g., J. A. Boyle, 'The Death of the Last 'Abbasid Caliph: A Contemporary Muslim Account', *Journal of Semitic Studies* 6 (1961), 160 (retrieving Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī's account); Ibn al-Fuwaṭī (Pseudo), *Kitāb al-Ḥawādīth* (Beirut, 1997), p. 360 and H. Gilli-Elewy, 'Al-Ḥawādīth al-ġāmi'a: A Contemporary Account of the Mongol Conquest of Baghdad, 656/1258', *Arabica* 58.5

also attest that the war was not total: this was true both for the Mongols – as both Hülegü and his commander found time to hear concerts during the warfare before the city was fully subjugated – and for the Baghdadi population, for whom death and violence were not the only option.

Hülegü's commanders were assigned 'looting spans' of one to three days, a description that supports the contention that the sack of Baghdad lasted for a week, as opposed to those sources claiming that it dragged on for thirty to forty days.<sup>14</sup> Despite the need to obey Hülegü's orders, the leading commanders – or at least the commander in this case – had a certain freedom of action according to their grasp of the situation, so that they could replace the plunder with 'tribute' from the residents. The ability of the commanders (both Hülegü and Baiju) to enjoy a concert before the city was fully subdued (as the caliph was probably still alive), attest to their confidence in the outcome of the campaign.

As for the Baghdadi population, Urmawī's example implies that certain groups and individuals managed to survive the conquest by a combination of submission, payment and skills. The alternative to violence was proposed by the Mongol commander, who suggested a safe conduct to those who would surrender and eventually buy their life. Although the tactic of foisting a 'pay or die' proposition on the defeated populace was not alien to the Mongols, Urmawī is the only one to bluntly note that it was imposed on the residents of Baghdad *after* the conquest: if the Mongols proposed such an option, it was usually before they attacked the city and only if the city offered no opposition.<sup>15</sup> That said, certain other Baghdadi groups are known to have received safe conduct (*amān*) from Hülegü,

(2011, October), p. 367; Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jāmi' al-tawārikh*, ed. B. Karīmī (Tehran, [1338] 1960, repr. 1983), 2, p. 713 and Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jāmi' al-tawārikh* [written as Rashiduddin Fazlullah, *Jami'u't-Tawarikh: Compendium of Chronicles*], trans. W. M. Thackston (Cambridge, MA: Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, Harvard University, 1998–9), 3, p. 498; al-Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat al-arab fī funūn al-adab* (Cairo, 1984), 23, p. 234; Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf* p. 43; and Āyatī, *Tahrīr-i ta'rikh*, p. 23.

14. The sources according to which the plunder lasted a week are, e.g., Boyle, 'The Death', p. 160; Bar Hebraeus, *The Chronography of Gregory Abū'l-Faraj the Son of Aaron, the Hebrew Physician, Commonly Known as Bar Hebraeus*, trans. E. A. W. Budge (repr. London, 2003), p. 431; Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jāmi'*, 1, p. 713 and Rashīd al-Dīn/Thackston, *Jami'u't-Tawarikh*, 2, p. 498; Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat al-arab*, 27, p. 383. Those ranging from 30 to 40 days include, among others, *Kitāb al-Ḥawādīth*, p. 359; Ibn al-Sā'ī (Pseudo), *Kitāb muḥtaṣar akhbār al-khulafā'* (Cairo, 1891), p. 136; Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya*, 13, p. 236; Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 42; and Āyatī, *Tahrīr-i ta'rikh*, p. 23.

15. See, e.g., R. Amitai, 'Im Westen nicht Neues? Re-examining Hülegü's Offensive into the Jazira and Northern Syria in Light of Recent Research', in *Historicizing the Beyond: The Mongolian Invasion as a New Dimension of Violence?*, eds F. Krämer, K. Schmidt and J. Singer (Heidelberg, 2011), p. 88.

often in return for exorbitant sums of money. While the details vary from source to source, most of them agree that *amān* was granted to the city's Christians, the Shī'ites from Hilla (a town between Baghdad and Kūfa), merchants from Khurāsān (who already had relations with the Mongols) and several Muslim notables.<sup>16</sup> The Shī'ites, merchants and perhaps others indeed secured their lives at considerable cost.<sup>17</sup> In all these instances, neighbours flocked to those who received protection, in the hope of saving their own lives. In the Shī'ites' case, their leader, Ibn Ṭāwūs, attested that all together the safe conduct enabled about 1,000 men (*nafs*) to find refuge with him.<sup>18</sup> As in the case of Urmawī's quarter, Mongol commanders were dispatched to guarantee the safety of the newly submitted groups, at least in the cases of the Christians and merchants.<sup>19</sup>

Another way to avoid violence was by skills: there are several other cases in which 'men of talent' like Urmawī received a safe conduct and an office in the Īl-Khānid administration. One of them is Falak al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Sayf al-Dīn Aydamīr al-Musta'ṣimī (639/1240–710/1310), a *mamlūk* of the last 'Abbāsīd Caliph who became a notable 'Abbāsīd commander and scribe (*amīr kātib*), and is described as an expert in calligraphy, *belles letters* and horsemanship, and was also famed for his beauty. When Baghdad was conquered he 'remained with the King of the Georgians (*Malik al-Kurj*, probably the commander of the Georgian troops that fought with Hülegü). Then he was brought to Hülegü, who appointed him as the supervisor (*shihna*) of the the wise men (*hukamā'*) who found refuge in his court and were dealing with chemistry'.<sup>20</sup> This seems like a case similar to Urmawī's, in which the skills of the conquered subject impressed both the local commander and Hülegü and led to the subject's joining the future

16. For example, see *Kitāb al-Ḥawādith*, pp. 359, 360 and Gilli-Elewy, 'Al-Ḥawādith', pp. 367, 368; Boyle, 'The Death', p. 159. According to Ṭūsī, scholars, sheikhs and whoever offered no resistance to the Mongols were offered *amān*. He also claims that this option was suggested at the early stages of the conquest. Such an option is also mentioned by Rashīd al-Dīn (Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jāmi'*, 1, p. 710, and Rashīd al-Dīn/Thackston, *Jami'u't-Tawarikh*, 2, p. 496) as offered to *qādīs* (judges), scholars, shaykhs, 'Alids, Nestorian priests and 'persons who do not combat against us'. Christians were spared according to Bar Hebraeus, *Chronography*, 1, p. 431, and according to the Arabic version of his work, Christians, Shī'ites and scholars avoided the sword: Ibn al-'Ibrī (Bar Hebraeus), *Ta'rikh mukhtasar al-duwal*, 3rd edn (Beirut, 1992), p. 271. Ibn Kathīr notes that the Jews were saved as well; Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya*, 13, p. 235.

17. The following sources refer to the Shī'ites: *Kitāb al-Ḥawādith*, p. 360 and Gilli Elewy, p. 368; 'Alī b. Mūsā Ibn Ṭāwūs, *Iqbāl al-a'māl* (Beirut, 1996), pp. 63, 65. For the payment exacted from the merchants, see Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya*, 13, p. 235.

18. Ibn Ṭāwūs, *Iqbāl*, p. 63.

19. *Kitāb al-Ḥawādith*, p. 359; and Gilli-Elewy, 'Al-Ḥawādith', p. 367.

20. Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, *Talkhūs majma' al-udabā'* (Tehran, 1995), 3, p. 281.

Īl-Khānid administration. No payment is mentioned here, but it may have been part of the deal. This story also suggests that other 'wise men' were employed in Hülegü's court, a fact referred to by various sources, most bluntly by Rashīd al-Dīn, who says, 'A great lover of wisdom, [Hülegü] encouraged the learned to debate the basic sciences and rewarded them with stipends and salaries. His court was adorned by the presence of scholars and wise men (*'ulamā' wa-hukamā'*).'<sup>21</sup>

The fate of the famous Baghdadi calligrapher – and Urmawī's student – Yāqūt al-Musta'ṣimī, also a *mamlūk* and close companion of the last 'Abbāsīd Caliph, may have been another example of this pattern. When the conquest began, Yāqūt was hiding from the Mongols in a minaret. He took out a towel over which he wrote a few words in extremely beautiful hand writing.<sup>22</sup> We do not know what happened next, but certainly Yāqūt continued to be active under the Īl-Khāns and won great fame: he is considered one of the top scholars of Abaqa's reign together with Urmawī.<sup>23</sup> Thus, we have here two or three examples of extremely talented Muslims, all of whom closely connected to the 'Abbāsīd court, who won Hülegü's grace.

This was also true for some other famous Baghdadi functionaries who sided with Hülegü during the siege, such as the famous vizier Ibn al-'Alqamī who retained his post (but died a few months after the conquest), the Caliph's *ṣāhib al-dīwān* (chief financial minister), Faḥr al-Dīn b. al-Dāmghānī and Ibn Darnūs. The two last mentioned persons served as the Caliph's messengers to Hülegü and after the conquest were appointed by him as the *ṣāhib al-dīwān* and the artisans' supervisor, respectively.<sup>24</sup> A few lesser Muslim functionaries

21. Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jāmi'*, 2, p. 734 and Rashīd al-Dīn/Thackston, *Jami'u't-Tawarikh*, 2, p. 513 (although he translates *'ulamā' wa-hukamā'* as philosophers and scientists. See also Ṭūsī's reference to this trait of Hülegü in J. A. Boyle, 'The Longer Introduction to the *Zij-i Ilkhānī* of Naṣīr ad-Dīn Ṭūsī', *Journal of Semitic Studies* (1963) 8.2, 246; Saḥādī, *al-Wāfi*, 27, pp. 399–400. For more examples see Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, 4, p. 203; and R. Amitai, 'Hülegü and His Wise men: Topos or Reality', in *Politics, Patronage and the Transmission of Knowledge in 13th–15th Century Tabriz*, ed. J. Pfeiffer (Leiden and Boston, 2014), pp. 15–34. For Hülegü as a humanist and patron of scholars see also Lane, *Early Mongol Rule*, esp. pp. 255–61.

22. V. Minorsky, trans., *Calligraphers and Painters: A Treatise by Qādī Aḥmad, Son of Mīr-Munshī* (circa A.H. 1015/A.D. 1606) (Washington, 1959), pp. 57–60.

23. On Yāqūt, see, e.g., al-'Umarī, *Masālik*, 10: 348; al-Dhahabī, *Ta'rikh al-Islām* (Beirut, 2003), 60, pp. 373–4; al-Kutubī, *Fawāt*, 2, pp. 592–3; and S. R. Canby, 'Yāqūt al-Musta'ṣimī', in *EI2*.

24. *Kitāb al-Ḥawādith*, pp. 361, 443, 443 and Gilli-Elewy, 'Al-Ḥawādith', p. 369; Juwaynī, *Ta'rikh-i Jahān-Gusha*, ed. M. Qazwīnī (Leiden: Brill, 1912, 1916, 1937) (hereon Juwaynī/Qazwīnī), 3, pp. 291–2 and Boyle, 'The Death', p. 160.

who met Hülegü also received administrative posts.<sup>25</sup> More revealing, the chief judge (*qāḍī al-quḍāt*) of Baghdad, al-Bandanijī, newly appointed by al-Musta'ṣim in 655/1257, also went to see Hülegü 'when Baghdad fell', and secured his continuous employment – he held the position until his death in 667/1269.<sup>26</sup>

In this respect, it is worthwhile referring to another passage of 'Umarī that appears in his history of the Īl-Khānate, a part of the volume he devoted to the Mongols in the same encyclopaedia from which Urmawī's story was taken. After describing how the Mongols of Iran married the Persians (*a'ājim*) and assimilated with them until in most cases the Mongols acted 'according to the customs of the Caliphs and Maliks while their own (Mongol) laws were set aside', he says:

When Hülegü conquered Baghdad at first he meant to leave things as they were (i.e. not to destroy the city), but he was unable to do it due to the forcefulness/violence (*shidda*) of the Mongols who were with him, and the excessive fear (*ifrāt takhawwuf*) of the people from them (the Mongols). Because they were so afraid of him they refused to meet him, while he wanted to convince them by obedience and payment not by eliminating the land. Yet the verdict of destiny is impossible to change.<sup>27</sup>

I will return to this paragraph below, for its fatalism, and while it may generally refer to Hülegü's pre-conquest expectations that the Caliph would surrender peacefully and save him the need to destroy Baghdad, it also fits nicely with Urmawī's description of obedience and payment as ways to avoid destruction after the conquest. While the text suggests that some of the Mongol troops and commanders were less inclined towards non-violent means, our previous examples show that those who dared to meet Hülegü often secured their life and positions.

What was the benefit of the Mongols from the non-violent arrangements? Financially, the gifts and payments were useful not less than the plunder and more easily attained (Urmawī estimated his investment in Hülegü as worth 60,000 dinars – six or twelve annual pensions, that is, a quite considerable sum).<sup>28</sup> Moreover, like former imperial conquerors, the Mongols needed the expertise of the

25. *Kitāb al-Ḥawādith*, p. 361 and Gilly Halevy, 'Al-Ḥawādith', p. 369.

26. Ibid.; Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, *Talkhīs majma' al-udabā'*, 1, p. 87; Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jāmi'*, 1, p. 714 and Rashīd al-Dīn/Thackston, *Jami'u't-Tawarikh*, 2, p. 499.

27. Al-'Umarī/Lech, *Das Mongolische Weltreich*, p. 102.

28. Al-'Umarī, *Masālik*, 10, p. 356.

conquered elites for consolidating their rule.<sup>29</sup> The retained administrators secured a certain stability in the devastated city and enhanced its restoration, to which the continuous functioning of the religious institutions also contributed. Furthermore, the submitted people enabled the Mongols to receive legitimation at least from certain segments of the population, some of them quite influential in the Baghdadi public opinion. Thus, Ibn Ṭāwūs (d. 667/1266), who led the Shī'ites' surrender to Hülegü, is the one said to have given the famous *fatwā* (legal opinion) on the question: 'Who is preferable, an infidel ruler who is righteous, or a Muslim ruler who is unjust?', stating that a just infidel was preferable to an unjust Muslim.<sup>30</sup> Even if we doubt the credibility of this story, mentioned only by Ibn al-Ṭiqṭaqā in about 701/1302, Ibn Ṭāwūs' reference to Hülegü as 'the King of Earth' (*malik al-arḍ*), certainly suggests an acceptance of the latter's authority.<sup>31</sup> Moreover, the Shī'ites brought to fore the tradition, ascribed to 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib that compared the Mongols with the sons of Qantūra, Abraham's wife and mother of the Turks, who were said to replace the Arabs (or the 'Abbāsids) as rulers.<sup>32</sup> This tradition, with its apocalyptic and less apocalyptic versions, certainly helped the Mongols to portray themselves as God's messengers, a position that, as will be discussed below, was highly instrumental in legitimising their violence.

As for the men of talents, they not only entertained Hülegü, but also bolstered his kingly reputation among contemporaneous rulers, Mongols and non-Mongol alike. The fact that these men were closely connected to the 'Abbāsīd court was probably an additional bonus, as Hülegü could ascribe to his court some of the caliphate's cultural grandeur.

All these advantages, however, do not mean that Hülegü was softened or that Mongol violence ceased. Certainly, the Mongols' basic policy, (namely 'those

29. For the Arabs use of the Sāsānian elites see, e.g., I. T. Kristó-Nagy, 'Conflict and Cooperation between Arab Rulers and Persian Bureaucrats at the Formation of the Islamic Empire', in *Empires and Bureaucracy in World History: From Late Antiquity to the Twentieth Century*, eds P. Crooks and T. Parsons (Cambridge, 2016), pp. 54–80 and I. T. Kristó-Nagy, 'Marriage after Rape: The Ambiguous Relationship between Arab Lords and Iranian Intellectuals as Reflected in Ibn al-Muqaffa's Oeuvre', in *Arabic Literary Culture: Tradition, Reception, and Performance*, eds M. Larkin and J. Sharlet (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, forthcoming).

30. Ibn al-Ṭiqṭaqā, p. 21 and trans. Whitting, p. 14.

31. Ibn Ṭāwūs, *Iqbāl*, pp. 63, 65.

32. Ibid.; al-'Allāma al-Ḥillī, *Kashf al-yaqīn* (Najaf, 1961), p. 28; Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rikh-i Waṣṣāf*, pp. 19, 36; Lane, p. 33; Abu Rukun, pp. 112–13 (and see there for other variants including a similar apocalyptic tradition ascribed to 'Abd Allāh b. 'Abbās); J. Pfeiffer, 'Faces Like Shields Covered with Leather': Keturah's Sons in the Post-Mongol Islamic Eschatological Traditions', in *Horizons of the World: Festschrift for İsenbike Togan*, eds İ. E. Binbaş and N. Kılıç-Schubel (Istanbul, 2011), pp. 557–94, esp. pp. 561–3.

who do not obey us will be destroyed') continued to be practised quite cruelly in the Mongol advance from Baghdad, into al-Jazīra and Syria during the conquest of Mayyāfāriqīn and Aleppo. These areas, despite the Baghdadi example, refused to submit immediately.<sup>33</sup> Yet, Hülegü's arrangements in Baghdad, hardly look like an attack on Islamic civilisation. Instead, it can be argued that Hülegü, while punishing the city for the Caliph's stubborn behaviour and his refusal to submit, was attempting at maintaining the city's stability and, furthermore, sought to enhance his kingly reputation by appropriating to his court some of the main representatives of 'Abbāsid glory.

It may be worth adding that another reason for doubting the alleged anti-Islamic character of the conquest of Baghdad is the fact that many Muslims – mostly Sunnīs – took part in Hülegü's troops. This is best manifested in the newly discovered and published chronicle ascribed to the polymath Quṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī (634–710/1236–1311), according to which Hülegü's troops included segments sent 'from Turkestan and Transoxania, the Atabegs of Fārs, the Sultans of Rūm (Anatolia), and the kings of Khurāsān, Sīstān, Māzandarān, Kirmān, Rustamdār, Shīrwān, Gurjīstān, Iraq, Adharbaijan, Arrān and Lūristān',<sup>34</sup> namely all the places already conquered by the Mongols. Apart from the Georgians, these troops were all or mostly Muslim.

#### HOW WAS THE VIOLENCE LEGITIMISED?

If we start again with Ṣafī al-Dīn Urmawī, while there is no doubt that he was scared to death of the Mongols' reputed cruelty, he refers to Mongol violence as a fact of life: Urmawī nonchalantly sent the Mongols to loot and capture the residents of other quarters, and he did not condemn the rape that was perpetrated at his home. The Mongols' actions were considered as a hateful but familiar prerogative of the conquerors, and did not prevent Urmawī from throwing his lot with them.

This mundane description of the violence derived from the fact that the invaders were perceived as divine punishment, as part of God's plan.<sup>35</sup> This view can also explain the relatively matter-of-fact character of early descriptions of

33. Amitai, 'Im Westen nicht Neues?', pp. 83–96.

34. Quṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī, *Akhbār-i Mughūlān* (Qum, 2010), pp. 23–4.

35. On this attitude as generally characterizing the Medieval attitude to foreign conquerors and to the Mongols see D. Baraz, *Medieval Cruelty: Changing Perceptions, Late Antiquity to the Early Modern Period* (Ithaca, 2003), pp. 91–113; see also al-'Umarī / Lech, *Das Mongolische Weltreich*, p. 102 quoted above and the citation from Ibn al-Fuwaṣī below.

the conquest, such as those of Abū Shāma (d. 665/1268), Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274) or al-Kāzarūnī (d. 697/1298)<sup>36</sup> as opposed to its later, more elaborated reconstructions. Certainly, the Mongols embraced this view, presenting themselves as the wrath of God in their letters to the Caliph and to Muslim and Christian rulers that they contacted before and after Baghdad.<sup>37</sup>

After the conversion of the Mongols to Islam, their violence received a more thorough justification, or God's plan became clearer.<sup>38</sup> Yet in Baghdad's case the legitimacy of Mongol violence must have been also related to the quick pace of

36. Abū Shāma, *Tarājīm rijāl al-qarnayn al-sādis wa-l-sābi' al-ma'rūf bil-dhawl 'alā al-rawḍatayn*, ed. M. Kawtharī (Cairo, 1947), p. 198; Kāzarūnī, *Mukhtaṣar al-tārīkh min awwal al-zamān ilā muntahā dawlat Banī al-'Abbās* (Baghdad, 1970), pp. 270ff; Boyle, 'The Death', pp. 151–61; and Juwaynī/Qazwīnī, 3, pp. 283–92; Cf. S. Conermann, 'Die Einnahme Bagdads durch die Mongolen im Jahre 1258: Zerstörung – Rezeption – Wiederaufbau', in *Städte aus Trümmern. Katastrophenbewältigung zwischen Antike und Moderne*, eds A. Ranft and A. Selzer (Göttingen, 2004), pp. 54–100; F. Krämer, 'The Fall of Baghdad in 1258: The Mongol Conquest and Warfare as an Example of Violence', in *Historicizing the 'Beyond': The Mongolian Invasion as a New Dimension of Violence?*, eds F. Krämer, K. Schmidt and J. Singer (Heidelberg, 2011), pp. 97–116.

37. See, e.g., R. Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks: The Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, 1260–1281* (Cambridge and New York, 1995), pp. 22–4; W. Brinner, 'Some Ayyūbid and Mamlūk Documents from Non-archival Sources', *Israel Oriental Studies* 2 (1972), 127–36; P. Meyvaert, 'An Unknown Letter of Hulagu, Il-Khan of Persia, to King Louis IX of France', *Viator* 11 (1980), 245–59; and see Timothy May's chapter 'The Mongols as the Scourge of God in the Islamic World' in this volume.

38. This is best expressed by Rashīd al-Dīn in his beginning of the story of Chinggis Khan:

May it not remain concealed from those of thought and contemplation that every destruction of a country or dispersal of a people that occurs through changeability and mutability in the world of generation and corruption is caused by divine grace and justice and contains within its folds great and magnificent godly wisdom. The carrying out of God's fiat in creating infinite beings necessitates that, since with the passage of eons all things must fall into lassitude, and with the turning of days and nights nations and realms must fall into ruin, in every epoch a great and mighty lord of fortune be singled out by heavenly assistance and garbed in a raiment of power in order to do away with that lassitude and degeneration and to endeavor mightily with his glittering sword to lay anew the foundation and base, to cleanse the field of realms, which has become a snare of destruction, of the defilement of all types and sorts of evil and self-serving men, and to cause the dust of sedition and corruption to settle.

Rashīd al-Dīn/Thackston, *Jami'u't-Tawarikh*, 1, pp. 141–2; Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jāmi'*, 1, pp. 213–14. This goes much deeper than the general legitimation of violence as God's plan apparent in the former quotes. In fact, it even brings to mind Sahlins' modern concept of the Stranger King, used for justifying colonial rule. (M. Sahlins, 'The Stranger King', *Indonesia and the Malay World* 36.105 (July 2008), pp. 177–99; I thank Dr Yoni Brack for this reference.)

the post-conquest restoration. For this I would like to cite another evidence, from the biography of 'Imād al-Dīn Qazwīnī, the deputy of the first Mongol governor of Iraq, which is brought in Ibn al-Fuwaṭī's biographical dictionary, *Talkhīs majma' al-udabā'*.

Ibn al-Fuwaṭī (d. 723/1323) personally experienced the fall of Baghdad, lost quite a few relatives there and was himself taken captive. Later, he was bought and released by Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, who brought him to Marāgha. After an illustrious career as a librarian in the Marāgha observatory, in 679/1280–1 he returned to Baghdad, where he served as the librarian of the Mustanṣiriyya College.<sup>39</sup> In the biography of 'Imād al-Dīn he says:

When God performed his verdict and ability (*qadā'ahu and qadarahu*) and killed the Caliph, when Baghdad was devastated, its central mosque burned, and the houses of God deserted, then Allah showed his grace, causing the appointment of 'Imād al-Dīn. He came [to Baghdad and] built mosques and colleges, and restored the shrines and hospices. He gave salaries to scholars, lawyers and sufis from the endowments of these places, and the glory of Islam came back to the city of peace.<sup>40</sup>

The annihilation of the Caliph and the devastation of Baghdad are ascribed here not to Hülegü or the Mongols but to God himself, namely Mongol violence is part of a divine plan. Moreover, 'Imād al-Dīn Qazwīnī who received this generous credit died in 660/1262, i.e. less than four years after the Mongol conquest. According to Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, these four years were enough time for restoring the city to its former religious glory. Undoubtedly, this positive attitude has a lot to do with the Mongols' decision to leave the city's endowments intact, thereby continuing to subsidise lecturers and students. They used their investment in scholarly institutions as a powerful tool for co-opting the religious and social elites whose members tend to write histories and lead the public opinion.<sup>41</sup> Of course, contradicting evidence that stress the magnitude of the massacre and devastation and their endurance can easily be found in other sources, but I tend to accept the version of Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, who was by far one of the best-informed

39. On Ibn al-Fuwaṭī see, e.g., F. Rosenthal, 'Ibn al-Fuwaṭī', in *EI2*; M. R. Shabībī, *Mu'arrikh al-'Irāq Ibn al-Fuwaṭī* (Baghdad, 1950).

40. Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, *Talkhīs majma' al-udabā'*, 2, pp. 125–6.

41. This Mongol policy is comparable to the rights conferred in Yuan China upon the Confucian households (*ru*), that also received pensions for continuing their studies. See M. Biran, 'Libraries, Books, and Transmission of Knowledge in Ilkhanid Baghdad', *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, forthcoming.

authorities on Īl-Khānid Baghdad. Moreover, the impression from my work in progress that reconstructs the cultural life in Īl-Khānid Baghdad, is much closer to his description (even if it is a bit exaggerated for the pace of the restoration) than to the elegies on the city's being deserted and empty, that were usually written by people much farther from the city in time and place. The restoration, which Hülegü had ordered to start even before he left the city in 656/1258, was physical, economic, religious and cultural, including the rebuilding and establishment of mosques, colleges and libraries.<sup>42</sup> Most of the renovation was performed by the Mongol-appointed Muslim officials like the above-mentioned 'Imād al-Dīn and mainly his rival, the historian 'Alā' al-Dīn Juwaynī, the governor of Baghdad under Mongol rule, whose long tenure (657–81/1259–83) certainly benefited the city. However, that the Baghdadi chronicle describes Hülegü's successor, the Īl-Khān Abaqa, as 'a just ruler who cherished the building of cities',<sup>43</sup> suggests that the local population was aware of the role of the Mongols, and not only the officials appointed by them, in the restoration process. Again, this became clearer in the post-Islamisation period, when Baghdad became a popular winter pasture of the Īl-Khāns, and was described, under Oljeitu, as 'heaven upon earth'.<sup>44</sup>

Moreover, as I have shown elsewhere,<sup>45</sup> at least in the specific case of music – an art favoured by the Mongols – the Īl-Khānid period was one of great advance and splendour. While benefiting both from Īl-Khānid patronage (Abū Sa'īd, the last Īl-Khān, was a noted musician himself) and the open world of the empire that enabled artistic and cultural contacts with China, India, Europe, Egypt and Syria, Īl-Khānid science of music was mainly based on the achievements of the 'Abbāsīd school, among which Urmawī's compilations continued to play a leading role. Namely, in the field of music, 'Abbāsīd culture did not decline but strived after the Mongol conquest.

In this respect, it is worth mentioning that references to cultural trauma – as opposed to the physical or political traumas of the conquest – are extremely rare in the sources and mainly appear in the mid–late fourteenth century onwards.<sup>46</sup>

42. See M. Biran, 'The Fall and Rise of Baghdad under Mongol Rule: Between History and Memory', paper read at the Winter Academy: Collapse, Jerusalem, 9–15 December 2012.

43. *Kitāb al-Hawādīth*, p. 453; For Baghdad's quick restoration see also H. Gilli-Elewy, *Bagdad nach dem Sturz des Kalīfats. Die Geschichte einer Provinz unter ilhanischer Herrschaft* (Berlin, 2000), p. 33; Biran, 'The Fall and Rise'.

44. Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, *Talkhīs majma' al-udabā'*, 2, p. 433.

45. Biran, 'Music', pp. 144–50.

46. Notable examples are Ibn al-Sā'ī (Pseudo), *Kitāb mukhtaṣar akhbār al-khulafā'* (Cairo, 1891), p. 137 that claims that the Mongols built horse-feeders from the books of the Baghdadi 'ulamā' (the fact that Mongol horses were usually fed on pasture, without feeders, does not give much credibility to this description); al-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt*



This is also the period in which the most apocalyptic – and nowadays often quoted – descriptions of Baghdad fall were composed at the Mamlūk sultanate – by people like al-Dhahabī (d. 749/1349), al-Subkī (d. after 769/1368) and Ibn al-Kathīr (d. 774/1373).<sup>47</sup> Perhaps after the Īl-Khānate's fall, when the Mamlūks had no real enemy vis-à-vis they can define their identity, they tried to magnify the fall of Baghdad in order to boost their subsequent victory in 'Ayn Jālūt, where they defeated the Mongols in 658/1260.<sup>48</sup> Soon afterwards, however, the great historian Ibn Khaldūn (d. 808/1406), while lamenting Baghdad's fall, saw it as a natural phase in history, which brought to the fore the rise of the Mamlūk Turks, who revived the 'Abbāsīd caliphate and saved Islam from both the Mongols and the Franks.<sup>49</sup>

In the Turco-Persian medieval and early modern world, not only the references to the conquest's cultural traumas are few, but the Īl-Khānate's cultural splendour is highlighted: in the Şafawīd and Ottoman periods the Īl-Khānate is remembered mainly due to its 'men of talents'. The Şafawīd historian Khwāndamīr finished his description of the 'Abbāsīd caliphate not with the death of the last Caliph but with Hülegü's revival (*nahḍat-i Hülegü*), praising the many scholars who were active under the Īl-Khānate (many of them Baghdadī figures

*al-Shāfi'iyya al-kubrā* (Aleppo, 1964), 8, pp. 271–7, who brings plenty of anecdotes of the Mongol anti-Islamic behaviour, e.g., that they – or their Christian troops – forced the Muslims to drink wine and eat pigs in the month of Ramaḍān (p. 271; as the conquest took place in Muḥarram, nine months before Ramaḍān, this is not too credible either; wine was quite common in Baghdad anyhow as is clear from Urmawī's description); and Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-'ibar* (Beirut, 1957), 3, p. 1106; 5, p. 1155, who says that the Mongols threw the Muslim scientific books (*kutub al-'ilm*) from Baghdad's libraries into the Tigris, just like the Muslims did with the Persian books when they conquered al-Madā'in (in the seventh century). Ibn Khaldūn, however, did not think that the Persian culture was ruined after the Arab conquest.

47. Subkī, *Tabaqāt*, 8, pp. 268–77; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh*, 56, pp. 372–7; Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya*, 13, pp. 233–7.
48. I owe this explanation to Richard Bulliet's comment during the third *Legitimate and Illegitimate Violence in Classical Islamic Thought* conference at the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, University of Exeter, 2012. For 'Ayn Jālūt see Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, pp. 26–48. For a description of Baghdad as a prelude to 'Ayn Jālūt see, e.g., U. W. Haarmann, 'Ideology and History, Identity and Alterity: The Arab Image of the Turk from the 'Abbasids to Modern Egypt', *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 20.2 (1988), 181–2.
49. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-'ibar*, 3, pp. 1106–7; see also A. Pistor-Hatam, 'Ursachenforschung und Sinngebung. Die mongolische Eroberung Bagdads in Ibn Khaldūns zyklischem Geschichtsmodell', in *Die Mamlūken. Studien zu ihrer Geschichte und Kultur. Zum Gedenken an Ulrich Haarmann (1942–1999)*, eds S. Conermann and A. Pistor-Hatam (Hamburg, 2003), pp. 313–34.

such as Yāqūt or Urmawī),<sup>50</sup> and Hülegü's patronage of scholars is brought as an important part of his legitimation by Muḥammad 'Alī Pasha, the Ottoman historian.<sup>51</sup> In retrospect the violence of the Mongol conquest was replaced with the brilliance of rulership and Īl-Khānīd cultural splendour, although this was at least partially because the annihilation of the caliphate facilitated the ability of both Şafawīds and Ottomans to gain legitimation as rulers.

In conclusion, the violence in the Mongol conquest of Baghdad was less total than previously thought and could have been spared by a combination of payment and/or skills. The violence was not directed specifically against Islamic religion or civilisation, the best representatives of which were quite respected by the Mongols. Moreover, even in the Arab world, Mongol violence was understood as legitimate – a hatred right of the conquerors – and as manifesting God's will. Furthermore, the quick restoration and intellectual growth of Īl-Khānīd Baghdad, followed by the conquerors' later conversion to Islam and the Ilkhanate's cultural splendour, made the violence of the conquest not only legitimate but also rather marginalised in the historical memory of the Turco-Iranian world. It was depicted in apocalyptic light mainly by some historians of the Mamlūk sultanate, especially from the mid-fourteenth century, namely after the fall of the Īl-Khānate, and due to the Mamlūks' need of legitimation. However, even in the Arab world, the violence of the conquest was eventually downplayed up to the rise of nationalism in the nineteenth century and the upheavals of the early twenty-first century.

50. Khwāndamīr, *Ḥabīb al-siyar*, 2, pp. 338–41.

51. C. H. Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Ali (1541–1600)* (Princeton, 1986), pp. 283–4.